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“The Egyptian people
Are fighting valiantly
For human rights.
The Israeli Knesset
Is fighting valiantly
To abolish
Human rights”1
I. INTRODUCTION
The recognition of Palestinian statehood has now become an important
issue in the evolution of the conflict between the state of Israel and the
Palestinian people. The issue has been made more interesting by decisions
of the Canadian Supreme Court and the International Court of Justice (ICJ).2
In particular, this Article refers to the judgment of the ICJ concerning the
Unilateral Declaration of Independence of Kosovo.3 This judgment adds
insights to the prospect of a Palestinian claim to statehood and independence
from an international law perspective. More generally, 2010 culminated in
the widespread perception that Israel’s leaders seek to maintain the status
quo indefinitely, leaving Palestinians as an occupied people, which
ostensibly secures Israeli interests.4 If true, such a position is contrary to
Israel’s international legal obligations and places Palestinian aspirations at
heightened risk.5 As the Palestinians’ representatives began seeking support
for international recognition for the state of Palestine, Israel reached out to
other countries—most significantly, the United States—to block such a
move.6 On December 15, 2010 the United States Congress passed a
resolution condemning acts by the Palestinians to seek unilateral (meaning
1

Uri Avnery, There and Here, HAARETZ GUSH SHALOM, Feb. 18, 2011.
See Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 (Can.) (ruling on Quebec’s
attempt to secede under international law); Accordance with International Law of the
Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J.
141 (July 22) (ruling on the legality of the Declaration of Independence issued by Kosovo).
3
Dapo Akande, ICJ Finds that Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence Not in Violation of
International Law, EUROPEAN J. INT’L L. BLOG (July 23, 2010), http://www.ejiltalk.org/icj-fin
ds-that-kosovos-declaration-of-independence-not-in-violation-of-international-law.
4
Lexington, Israel and America Obama in the Middle, ECONOMIST (May 25, 2011), http://
www.economist.com/blogs/Lexington/2011/05/isreal_and_america.
5
Andrew Hammond, Israel Must Meet International Obligations: Fayyad, REUTERS (Feb.
11, 2009), http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/02/11/us-israel-elections-fayyad-sb-idUSTRE51
A2RT20090211.
6
Mark Perry & Ali Abunimah, The US Role as Israel’s Enabler, AL JAZEERA (Jan. 26,
2011), http://www.aljazeera.com/palestinepapers/2011/01/201112614122782761.html%3E.
2
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without the permission of Israel) recognition of the state of Palestine.7
Recent developments in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict suggest that a
clarification of international law standards regarding new states, as well the
issue of recognition of Palestinian statehood, is ripe for analysis.
State recognition is widely perceived to be a political fact with legal
consequences.8 In the real world context of state recognition, the legal
aspect actually reflects the circumstances of the proto-state (including its
political background), making the distinction between political fact and legal
consequence less clear.9 Analyzing the prospects for any proto-state requires
the serious consideration of international law processes—the clarification of
which may guide the development of outcomes in particular cases. The
contemplated transition in proto-Palestine is one such case.
Many more international law issues other than mere state recognition are
implicated in an effort to establish a sustainable solution to this longstanding
conflict. The international law jurisdiction over the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict is exceedingly complex.10 Frequently, there is a contest between
apparently settled international law standards and the brute facts of either
denial or noncompliance—a challenge to the role of international law to
effectively provide appropriate normative guidance to the parties.11
Moreover, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is one that generates dynamism of
facts. Since new facts are generated continuously, those facts redefine
contextual reality and, as changed contexts emerge, the contextual
background itself is redefined. This implies that new facts reshape the legal
framework and the relevant discourse. Nevertheless, the complexity
attending the normative salience of international law and the context of brute
power relations can be unpacked through configurative legal analysis, which
uses the legal process as a tool for clarifying problems (rather than narrowly
demanding prescriptive outcomes). Using configurative analysis, this
presentation envelopes the necessary contextual background within which

7

H.R. Res. 1765, 111th Cong. (2010) (enacted).
Philip Marshall Brown, Editorial Comment, The Legal Effects of Recognition, 44 AM. J.
INT’L L. 617, 617 (1950).
9
Bridget L. Coggins, Secession, Recognition & the International Politics of Statehood, at 44
(2006) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Ohio State University) (available at http://etd.ohiolink.
edu/view.cgi/Coggins%20Bridget%20L.pdf?acc_num=osu1154013298).
10
See Weizmann-Feisal Agreement, World Zionist Org.-Arab Kingdom of Hedjaz, Jan. 3,
1919 (agreeing to look into the possibilities of an Arab state, later repudiated); Declaration of
Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements (“Oslo Agreement”), Sept. 13, 1993
(agreeing to commence negotiations on the permanent status of the disputed land in Gaza and
Jericho).
11
HANS KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 393–94 (Robert Tucker ed., 2d ed.
1966).
8
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the contestations of international law norms and the search for satisfactory
conclusions are important.
International law functions not only by declaring the operative rules and
principles that form its procedural and substantive background, but also (as
an epistemological tool) by reframing the search for relevant facts having
important legal effects.12 In the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict,
both sides contest the contextual reality and, consequently, the urgency of
addressing particular factual and legal issues. The unwillingness of the
parties (through their constituted leadership) to confront legitimate issues of
coexistence corresponds with a prevalent ambivalence toward legal norms
that direct effective solutions. An appropriate approach to international law
may permit us to better identify and understand problems that ultimately
require solutions consistent with an evolving legal and political reality.
This Article focuses on one aspect of a complex context of claims and
counterclaims by the Israeli and Palestinian peoples: the status of Palestinian
claims to statehood under international law. These claims have been variously
contested by the Israeli authorities as well as members of the international
community. We aim to explore the precise legal and political grounds for
these claims and contestations, in order to arrive at a contextual reality that will
permit the Israelis and Palestinians to move forward in the process of arriving
at a fair and settled agreement. This status is necessary for individuals to begin
to accept the status quo and build upon these foundations with activities that
will enrich the region and the lives of its people.
From the onset, we wish to point out that we assign a positive value
judgment to both perspectives; pro-Israel and pro-Palestine. From this
perspective we have tried to provide an objective appraisal of the claim of
Palestinians to independence and statehood. We have tried to take into
account the interest of the most prominent stakeholders. We have come to
the conclusion that the recognition of Palestinian statehood is in the common
interest of all the parties and more generally of the world community. This
Article therefore, suggests appropriate international law strategies to
expeditiously secure the international recognition of statehood for the
Palestinian community.
The plan of this Article is to provide the background facts important to
the respective claims of both the Israelis and the Palestinians. In particular,
the Palestinian claim rests on the boundaries recognized by the Security
Council. Israeli claims, which are not clearly delineated, are probably
12

See Andrew F. Sunter, TWAIL as Naturalized Epistemological Inquiry, 20 CAN. J.L. &
JURIS. 475 (2007) (describing Third World Approaches to International Law as an
epistemological study).
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influenced by the historical claim to Israeli boundaries reflected in the Eretz
Israel idea. The Article reviews Israeli statehood recognition and places the
Palestinian issue in the context of the League of Nations Mandate System
and the United Nations. The Article traces the conflict following partition
and reviews the issue of Palestinian statehood in terms of mandate
expectations as well as contemporary expectations of international law.
Guidance is sought from recent case law concerning the claims relating to
Quebec and Kosovo. The Article also reviews the problems of Israeli
occupancy and their effect on Palestinian rights and international relations.
The Article also seeks to clarify, as objectively as possible, the United
States’ national interests in an expeditious solution to the conflict between
the Israelis and the Palestinians. On the basis of the policy clarifications of
the respective interests, we provide a provisional conclusion which favors the
recognition of Palestinian self-determination, statehood, and sovereignty.
The penultimate part of the Article examines the interests of the Palestinians
in the achievement of a two-State solution to advance peace in the region.
The Article also seeks to clarify the possible Israeli interests in securing a
two-State solution to advance the settlement of problems in the region.
Finally, the last part of the Article reviews the strategic options that the
Palestinians might employ in seeking to advance the claims to sovereignty,
self-determination and statehood.
II. BACKGROUND FACTS RELEVANT TO THE CLAIMS FOR PALESTINIAN
STATEHOOD
A.

The Land and People of Palestine and Eretz Israel

Prior to the British conquest and the assumption of the Palestine Mandate
responsibilities, the territory was part of the Ottoman Empire. That Empire
(although multiethnic) incorporated territories and populations of the Middle
East that were largely—from a cultural point of view—Arabic.13 Recent
history of Palestine shows how Palestine has been under the control of
various external forces; first subject to the force of invading conquerors and
then the paternalistic caprice of colonial rule.14 Prior to WWII, the
Palestinian territories were an international mandate under the authority of
the League of Nations.15 Britain, which had conquered an occupied territory
13

Mim Kemal Oke, The Ottoman Empire, Zionism and the Question of Palestine, 14 INT’L
J. MIDDLE EAST STUD. 329, 330 (1982).
14
See NICHOLAS BETHELL, THE PALESTINE TRIANGLE: THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN THE BRITISH,
THE JEWS, AND THE ARABS, 1935–48 (1979) (discussing the recent occupiers of the territory).
15
See Council of the League of Nations, League of Nations Mandate for Palestine, July 24,
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and displaced the Ottoman Empire, was granted the mandate to administer
Palestine.16 This reflected the political reality that conquerors could retain
their conquests subject to a weak form of international concern under the
League’s mandate system. One of the obligations of the mandatory power
was to secure the well-being and interests of the people under its control and
authority. Making this international obligation more complex, Great
Britain’s Balfour Declaration—articulated in 1917 prior to the end of the
war—asserted British sympathies for Zionist ambitions in the Palestinian
territories for Jewish immigration and settlement.17 In this sense, the
Declaration was probably not consistent with the mandatory obligations of a
Class A Mandate. British practices, which allowed significant Jewish
immigration, had the consequence of creating a critical Jewish presence in
Palestine, which eventually shaped future events.18 What is most salient
during this period of recent history is the lack of promotion of selfdetermination for the Palestinian residents by the UK.19
The defeat of the Ottoman Empire during the WWI meant that the
conquering power had acquired temporary dominium over Palestine by
conquest. The peace process created a new international institution, the
League of Nations.20 Under the Charter of the League a dispensation was
made that the territories conquered by the conquerors would remain under
their control, subject to a legal regime called the League of Nations Mandate
System.21 The conquerors could keep the conquests, but mandate obligations
required them to administer these territories in the interest of the inhabitants.22
Palestine was a Class A mandate.23 This Class A mandate was somewhat
1922, http://cojs.org/cojswiki/League_of_Nations_Mandate_for_Palestine%2C_July_24%2C_19
22 (entrusting the administration of the territory of Palestine to Great Britain).
16
Stefan Brooks, British Mandate for Palestine, in 3 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI
CONFLICT: A POLITICAL, SOCIAL, AND MILITARY HISTORY 770 (Spencer C. Tucker ed., 2008).
17
See generally JONATHAN SCHNEER, THE BALFOUR DECLARATION: THE ORIGINS OF THE
ARAB ISRAELI CONFLICT (2010) (explaining the history of Britain’s Balfour Declaration).
18
See Avi Shlaim, The Balfour Declaration And its consequences, in YET MORE
ADVENTURES WITH BRITANNIA: PERSONALITIES, POLITICS AND CULTURE IN BRITAIN 251–70
(Wm. Roger Louis ed., 2005).
19
See EDWARD W. SAID, THE POLITICS OF DISPOSSESSION: THE STRUGGLE FOR PALESTINIAN
SELF-DETERMINATION, 1969–1994 (1995) (explaining the Palestinians struggle for statehood
through twenty-five years of exile).
20
See generally F.S. NORTHEDGE, THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS: ITS LIFE AND TIMES, 1920–
1946 (1986) (describing the history of League of Nations and the United Nations.
21
See Nele Matz, Civilization and the Mandate System under the League of Nations as
Origin of Trusteeship, 9 MAX PLANCK Y.B. UNITED NATIONS L. 47, 47–95 (2005).
22
Id. at 72.
23
But see Eli E. Hertz, “Mandate for Palestine”: The Legal Aspects of Jewish Right, http://
www.mythsandfacts.org/conflict/mandate_for_palestine/mandate_for_palestine.htm (last visited
Mar. 19, 2012) (arguing that Palestine was never a Class A mandate).
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distinctive in the sense that it contained a cláusula that was not expressed in
Article 22 of the League Covenant. This cláusula involved the encouragement
of Jewish immigration for the establishment of a natural home for the Jews
who were a minority in Palestine.24 There was an ostensible incompatibility
between the British Balfour Declaration for promoting immigration to
Palestine and the requirements of Article 22. According to Balfour:
The contradiction between the letters of the Covenant and the
policy of the Allies is even more flagrant in the case of the
“independent nation” of Palestine than in that of “independent
nation” of Syria. For in Palestine we do not propose even to go
through the form of consulting the wishes of the present
inhabitants of the country . . . .25
Balfour was very explicit about the problem of assuming mandate
responsibility and the British commitment regarding Jewish immigration.
Corresponding with Prime Minister Lloyd in 1919, George Balfour wrote
“[t]he weak point of their mutually agreed position was that in Palestine we
deliberately and rightly declined to accept the principal of selfdetermination.”26 He stressed that the position of Jews outside of Palestine
was a matter of global importance and added that he believed that Jews had a
historic claim to a home in their ancient land.27 Thus, there was the mandate
of Palestine administered by Great Britain, which had incompatible
objectives that were never clearly put on the table so as to rationally
reconcile them with the precise terms of the mandate’s international
obligations. The mandate’s central normative obligation was to exercise the
mandate in the interest of the local inhabitants.28 There is abundant evidence
that the constitutional position of Palestine was as a proto-state.29 In short,
Britain, the mandatory power, was never recognized as exercising sovereign
authority over Palestine. There is a strong view among juris consults that the
locus of authority in ‘Class A’ mandate Territories was vested in the
population of the territories themselves.30 Indeed, for a multitude of
24
Mark Rosenblit, International Law and the Jewish People’s Collective Rights of Settlement
and Self-Determination in the Land of Israel, http://www.rosenblit.com/Law.htm (last visited
Mar. 19, 2012).
25
JOHN QUIGLEY, THE STATEHOOD OF PALESTINE: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE MIDDLE
EAST CONFLICT 75 (2010).
26
A.P. THORNTON, IMPERIALISM IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 123 (1977).
27
QUIGLEY, supra note 25, at 75.
28
Hertz, supra note 23.
29
QUIGLEY, supra note 25, at 75.
30
See Yoram Rabin & Roy Peled, Transfer of Sovereignty Over Populated Territories From
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purposes Palestine was viewed as a State. A Permanent Court of
International Justice in the Mavrommatis Palestine Concession’s Case31
clearly regarded Palestine as a State.32
The general conclusion that we might draw from the British administered
Palestinian Mandate is that unlike the mandates in Syria and Iraq, there was
no progression of indigenous self-determination to statehood.33 However,
there is considerable consensus in scholarship and practice that Palestine was
a proto-state and that its latent sovereignty was rooted in the Palestinian
inhabitants of the territory.34 Attributes of sovereignty were residing in the
body politic and the Mandate administration.35 The fact that statehood was
not achieved for the Palestinians could be found in Great Britain’s
commitment to the Balfour Declaration for the creation of a homeland for the
Jewish diaspora which would occupy the boundaries of the ancient state of
Israel. The United Kingdom was therefore in a profound decisional
dilemma: fulfilling the mandate obligations repudiated by Balfour and
realizing that Balfour declaration promises repudiated the mandate. This was
a dilemma that has not yet been resolved. Perhaps the British foreign office
version of “Foggy Bottom”36 considered that it could simply muddle along in
the hope that its convenient conclusion might somehow present itself.
B. The Recognition of the State of Israel
When Britain, the mandatory power, requested in 1947 that the United
Nations consider the future dispensation for the territory defined within the
Palestinian Mandate, the U.N. General Assembly created a special
committee to investigate the international legal status of the Palestinian
territory.37 The committee determined that the British Mandate should be
terminated and that independence should be granted to Palestine at the
Israel to a Palestinian State: The International Law Perspective, 17 MINN. J. INT’L L. 59 (2008)
(exploring the concept of the transfer of sovereignty over territories from Israel to Palestine in
the context of International law).
31
Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions (Greece v. U.K.), 1924 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 3 (Aug. 30).
32
QUIGLEY, supra note 25, at 59.
33
See Jeff J. Corntassel & Tomas Hopkins Primeau, Indigenous “Sovereignty” and
International Law: Revised Strategies for Pursuing “Self-Determination,” 17 HUMAN RTS. Q.
343 (1995) (arguing that efforts towards indigenous sovereignty merely increase tensions
between indigenous peoples and states).
34
Comm. on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, Rep. on the
International Status of the Palestinian People (Jan. 1, 1980).
35
Id.
36
WILLIAM SAFIRE, SAFIRE’S POLITICAL DICTIONARY 256 (2008). Foggy Bottom is the
nickname for the headquarters of the United States Department of State.
37
G.A. Res. 106(S-1), para. 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/106(S-I) (May 15, 1947).
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earliest possible time.38 Despite the recommendation of “independence” and
the committee’s majority view that Palestine was to be partitioned into an
Arab state and a Jewish state, the committee stipulated that the territory’s
Arab and Jewish communities were to be linked in an economic
association.39 The status of Jerusalem, it was recommended, should be a
separate entity under international supervision.40 The U.N. General
Assembly, after lengthy debate, decided with more than 2/3 of a majority to
accept the partition recommendations. The U.N. General Assembly decision
came in the form of Resolution 181, November 1947.41 Of particular
importance is paragraph 3 of Resolution 181, which provides:
Independent Arab and Jewish States and the Special
International Regime for the City of Jerusalem . . . shall come
into existence in Palestine two months after the evacuation of
the armed forces of the mandatory Power has been completed
but in any case not later than 1 October 1948. The boundaries
of the Arab State, the Jewish State, and the City of Jerusalem
shall be as described in Parts II and III below.42

38
Rep. to GOAR, U.N. Spec. Comm. on Palestine 2d Sess., Sept. 3, 1947, para. 1, U.N.
Doc. A/364 (1947).
39
Id.
40
Id.
41
G.A. Res. 181(II), U.N. Doc. A/RES/181(II) (Nov. 29, 1947).
42
Id. at I(A), para. 3.
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Of particular interest are the terms indicating that two states “shall come
into existence” after the termination of the Mandate.43 This seems to suggest
that, by decision of the U.N. General Assembly, there is a legal expectation
that the two communities within the territorial space of Palestine shall,
according to the boundary delimitations of partition, establish sovereign
states under the authority of the U.N. Charter. This is probably an unusual
approach to either the creation or recognition of an entity with sovereign
status under international law.44 The conventional approach would start with
a community acting as a people and with discernible leadership and
representation expressing a claim to self-determination and independence.45
This claim may then be further supported by facts relating to the expression
of territorial control, or some dimensions thereof, as well as organized
political authority sufficient to give coherence to the claim for selfdetermination and independence.46 This claim would be followed by a
degree of structured organization of the authority components of the
claimants so that the elements of basic governance within such a context are
discernible.47 Sometimes such an internally-created entity will initiate the
development of a future transitional or tentative framework of constitutional
governance which would be the factual precondition that should result in a
declaration of independent statehood.48
In a sense, Resolution 181 seems to have influenced the Jewish
community in the partitioned part of Palestine to declare on May 14, 1948
the existence of the state of Israel.49 This declaration was followed by other
sovereign states bilaterally recognizing the state of Israel as a sovereign
nation-state.50 This indicates that the declaration not only met certain factual
preconditions, but also that those preconditions proceeded from the
expectation in Resolution 181 that each community would establish the
preconditions for a declaration of statehood. In this sense, the Israeli
43

Id.
See generally JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
(2006) (describing the broad treatment of statehood, particularly in relation to Israel and
Palestine).
45
Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States art. 3, Dec. 26, 1933, 49 Stat.
3097, 165 L.N.T.S. 19 [hereinafter Montevideo Convention].
46
Id. art. 3.
47
Id. arts. 4–10.
48
Bardo Fassbender, The United Nations Charter as Constitution of the International
Community, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 529, 544–45 (1998).
49
The Declaration Of The Establishment of the State of Israel, May 14, 1948, ISRAEL
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, available at http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace%20Process/Gui
de%20to%20the%20Peace%20Process/Declaration%20of%20Establishment%20of%20State%2
0of%20Israel.
50
Id. (stating recognition by the United States the night of and by the USSR three days after).
44
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declaration was preceded by the General Assembly decision, which
established the territorial contours of the state of Israel in terms of the
partition resolution. Moreover, the Resolution gave a quasi-judicial
imprimatur that the international community expected communities within
the partitioned territories to seize the opportunity for declaring statehood. It
therefore would seem to be rare that the creation of a state and a declaration
by its people are preceded by a legal fact creating some factual conditions
and suggesting that there is an expectation that, from these factual
conditions, the community will seize upon the legal “green light” of
statehood. Usually, the entity establishes core minimum facts regarding its
claim to statehood and then seeks recognition from an organization like the
U.N. that it is entitled to recognition as a sovereign state.51
C. Palestine Mandate and United Nations System
By 1948, Britain had had enough of the internal unrest and acts of
terrorism directed at British forces by Zionist militias in Palestine, and
therefore ceded to the United Nations the mandate and attendant
responsibilities.52 Within the United Nations, a resolution was generated that
partitioned Palestine for the establishment of a Jewish state (57% of the land)
and for an Arab state (43% of the land).53
U.N. General Assembly
resolutions are in general not legally binding, although they suggest that they
are, as a matter of good faith, politically binding.54 In any event, it was the
expectation of the target audience that the partition lines constituted a legally
binding definition of respective territorial claims. In addition, the Resolution
does not declare the existence of two states. Rather, it declares that the
territorial partition is expected to constitute the boundaries of a Jewish and
Arab state, subject to further conditions. This critical junction theoretically
permitted the removal of the colonial power and ostensibly transferred

51
See generally Thomas D. Grant, Defining Statehood: The Montevideo Convention and its
Discontents, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 403 (1999) (discussing different theories of
establishing statehood).
52
A Summary of Zionist Terrorism in the Near East, 1944–1948; THE FRENCH CONNECTION
(Oct. 1, 1948), http://iamthewitness.com/doc/Bunche.Report.on.Zionist.Terrorism.in.the.Near.
East.htm.
53
G.A. Res. 181(II), supra note 41; Zaha Hassan, The Palestinian Constitution and the
Geneva Accord: The Prospects for Palestinian Constitutionalism, 16 FLA. J. INT’L L. 897, 902
(2004).
54
Gregory J. Kerwin, The Role of United Nations General Assembly Resolutions in
Determining Principles of International Law in United States Courts, 1983 DUKE L.J. 876,
899 n.90 (1983).
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control to the U.N., which sanctioned the occupancy of Palestinian territories
by growing numbers of Jewish immigrants.55
To a large extent, the new Jewish settlers were refugees from elsewhere,56
but they also staked their claim to Palestinian lands based on a “right of
return,” which is considered by many Jews their biblical and historical
birthright.57 For the resident Palestinians, it was likely overwhelming and
threatening to see such an influx of outsiders claiming the best pieces of land
and to have no control over the immigration, taxation, and property policies
that gave preference to the Jewish settlers. More challenging to the
indigenous Palestinian population may have been the claim that these
settlers, many of whom had never set foot in Palestine, claimed a superior
heritage to the land.58 Nevertheless, Jewish culture—shaped in many ways
by the exile from Palestine and the recurring experiences of extreme
marginality and persecution from majority cultures everywhere—solidified
around the identity of a community united in the Diaspora and destined to
return.59 Arguably, it was this strength of identity—tied to a geographic
location—that permitted the Jewish settlers to assert and achieve independent
statehood after the Partition in 1948, when the Palestinian residents could
not.
The Partition Resolution prescribed the creation of two states, each
guaranteeing certain (new) standards of normative state behavior, but the
Partition Resolution was only partially carried out.60 The partition claim
requires each community to create a constituent assembly of each “state” for
the purpose of drafting “a democratic constitution for its state.”61 Such a
drafting would be guided by an international mandate “guaranteeing to all
persons equal and non-discriminatory rights in civil, political, economic and
religious matters and the enjoyment of human rights and fundamental
freedoms, including freedom of religion, language, speech and publication,
55

See generally Michael Akehurst, The Arab-Israeli Conflict and International Law, in
THE PALESTINE QUESTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 19–40 (Victor Kattan ed., 2008).
56
Press Release, Dep’t of Pub. Info., Ten Countries Reply to the U.N. On Jewish
Immigration into Palestine, U.N. Press Release PAL/39 (June 19, 1947).
57
See generally NUR MASALHA, THE BIBLE AND ZIONISM: INVENTED TRADITIONS,
ARCHAEOLOGY AND POST-COLONIALISM IN ISRAEL-PALESTINE (2007); Ayelet Shachar, Whose
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education assembly and association.”62 Israel was recognized as a state with
the promise that a formal constitution would be adopted no later than
October 1, 1948.63 However, the plan of drafting a comprehensive written
constitution for the State of Israel, consistent with the expectations of
Resolution 181, was never realized.64 In fact, the state of Israel is officially a
Jewish state, and it has no constitution.65 Although there was a Declaration
of the Establishment of the State of Israel, which announced that the new
state “will endure complete equality of social and political rights to all its
inhabitants irrespective of religion, race or sex,”66 this declaration was not
passed by the Knesset and therefore has no legal efficacy within Israel.67
Only one state was created (although it failed to adhere to the prescribed
state behavior required of the Partition Resolution); and one state failed to be
born.68
D. Conflict Following the Partition Resolution
Armed conflict broke out between the newly born Jewish state and
surrounding Arab states.69 To the historians of Israel, the resulting conflict
became the War of Independence.70 To the Palestinians’ historians these
events were catastrophic and were symbolized by the term “Nakba.”71 Since
the Israelis thought that the Arab initiation of conflict was, in effect, a
violation of international law, and since they repelled Arab attacks and
62
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64
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occupied territories beyond the partition line,72 the question that emerged
was—since the Israelis considered themselves to be victims, and since they
were somewhat victorious73—were they victims entitled to the spoils
(including ground gains in territory) from the conflict. Unfortunately,
modern international law is not as generous regarding the acquisition of
territory through the use of force.74 Thus, there was (and remains) a concern
about the extension of Israeli sovereignty beyond its lawfully declared
partition borders.75 These new borders were somewhat stabilized by the
Armistice Agreements, founded on the military status quo, between Israel
and the Arab states.76 A principle of realism seemed to influence the
international appraisal of Israel’s new borders, which were shaped by the
Armistice Agreements. The United States’ delegation to the U.N. was
instructed to support Israel’s request to keep the Negev.77 The U.S.
considered that, practically, the Israeli borders were now a non-issue.
Since 1948, the following events transpired: the Suez invasion of 1956,
the Six-Day War of 1967, the October War of 1973, Israel’s invasion of
Lebanon in 1982, and the most recent War in Lebanon in 2006, and
“Operation Cast Lead” in Gaza during winter of 2008–2009.78 It was after
the 1967 Six-Day War that a number of Palestinian organizations joined
together to form the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO).79 The
72
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Palestinian Covenant stipulated that: (1) Israel should be removed from its
role as occupier of the West Bank and Gaza, (2) a Palestinian state is to be
established in the West Bank and Gaza, and (3) the state of Israel is to be
dismantled.80 Clearly, this final point hardened the resolve of the Israeli
policymakers to strengthen the occupancy of the West Bank and Gaza.81 In
any event, the occupancy of Palestine left no doubt that Israel envisioned an
indefinite occupation regime. This policy was supported by the full might of
the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF).82 This compelled the PLO to look to other
strategies to advance its objectives.83 It sought to secure for its cause and its
people a maximum amount of diplomatic recognition. It stressed that the
foundations of Palestinian claims to statehood were founded on the principle
of self-determination, to which there was substantial commitment
internationally.84 For example, Article 1 of the U.N. Charter expresses the
idea of “respect for the principle of . . . self-determination of peoples.”85 The
principle is reiterated in Article 55.86 Two significant conventions—the
International Convention on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the
International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(ICESCR)—include the affirmation that “[a]ll people have the right of selfdetermination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political
status and freely pursue their economic, social, and cultural development.”87
The U.N. Declaration on Friendly Relations also affirms the principle of selfthe war was more than simply a matter of Israeli independence; rather, a specific strategy
existed to drive out the indigenous Palestinian population, seize their land, and create the
conditions for a Jewish majority state.
80
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81
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82
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determination of peoples and stipulates that every state has a duty to respect
this right in accordance with the provisions of the Charter.88 Also, in 1993,
the World Conference on Human Rights adopted the Vienna Declaration and
Programme of Action.89 This document stresses its affirmation of the right
of self-determination of all peoples. The Helsinki Final Act also stresses the
salience of the right to self-determination.90
The PLO also secured recognition of its role as representative of the
Palestinian people in their quest for self-determination.91 Recognition was
given by the Arab League.92 This process has resulted in over 100 states
recognizing the PLO.93 Over sixty states provide the PLO with full
diplomatic status. Fifty states recognize the PLO but have not authorized the
establishment of PLO embassies.94 States also permit PLO offices to
function under the name of the Arab League.95 These developments do not
indicate the existence of a Palestinian state or government in exile. They
focus on the PLO as the sole representative of Palestinian self-determination
rights.96 As early as 1969, the U.N. General Assembly began adopting
88
Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res.
2625(XXV), U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 121 (Oct. 24, 1970) [hereinafter G.A.
Res. 2625(XXV)].
89
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authority in any Palestinian territory that was to be liberated.”).
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González Vallejo, Recognition of the State of Palestine and the Hypocrisy, Committee in
Solidarity with the Arab Cause (2011) (noting that as of 1988, 104 states recognized
Palestine).
94
Directory: Palestine Embassies, Missions, Delegations Abroad, PERMANENT OBSERVER
MISSION OF PALESTINE TO THE UNITED NATIONS (Jan. 25, 2011), http://www.un.int/wcm/conte
nt/site/Palestine/cache/offonce/pid/11548.
95
Member States: Palestine, ARAB LEAGUE ONLINE (last visited Mar. 19, 2012), http://www.
arableagueonline.org/wps/portal/en/inner?current=true&urile=wcm:path:/LAS/las/las_en/about_l
as/member_states/palestine.
96
Antonio Cassese, The Israel-PLO Agreement and Self-Determination, 4 EUR. J. INT’L L.
564, 570 (1993) (noting that the PLO is the “internationally recognized and representative
organization of the Palestinians”).

358

GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.

[Vol. 40:341

resolutions that recognized the Palestinian right to self-determination as well
as the recognition of the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian
people.97 The PLO secured an invitation to participate in U.N. deliberations
and conferences organized under the authority of the General Assembly as
well as the Security Council.98 The PLO has had observer status at the
U.N.99 Israel, however, has resisted the idea of “creeping” recognition of
Palestinian institutions100 because they suggest a “creeping” validation of
their claims.101
Two of the critical decisions of the U.N. Security Council concerning the
Palestinian-Israeli conflict are Resolution 242 (22 November 1967)102 and
Resolution 338 (22 October 1973).103 Resolution 242 recognizes the
“inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war.”104 Thus, the
Resolution stipulates that a form of “creeping” annexation of the West Bank
and Gaza is effectively a violation of Resolution 242 and general
international law.105 The Resolution also stipulates that the Charter requires
a “just and lasting peace,” which includes some of the following principles:
(1) the Israeli armed forces withdraw from occupied territories; (2) an end to
the claim of belligerency; and (3) a respect for the “sovereignty, territorial
integrity, and political independence” of all states in the area.106 The
Resolution also stipulates that freedom of navigation in international waters
is to be respected, and refers to “a just settlement of the refugee problem”
and also to the “territorial inviolability and political independence of every
State” through the establishment of demilitarized zones.107 In Resolution

97
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338, the Security Council called upon all relevant parties to implement
Security Council Resolution 242 after a cease-fire.108
These resolutions imply that the right to self-determination implicates
rights that accrue at a minimum to a de facto state, including claims to
sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence. It therefore calls for an
end to Israeli occupation. The United States, which has been a strong
supporter of Israel,109 has been reluctant to recognize Palestinian identity in
the international environment.110 This has been done pursuant to the Sinai
Agreement of 4 September 1975.111 In this Agreement, the U.S. pledged to
not negotiate with the PLO or to recognize it so long as it refused to
recognize the right of Israel to exist and so long as the PLO refuses to accept
Resolutions 242 and 338.112 Additionally, the U.S. Congress added a further
element of the U.S. commitment—namely, that the PLO must renounce
terrorism.113 In short, the U.S. position was that once the PLO publically
accepted these resolutions, recognized Israel as a sovereign state, negotiated
peace with Israel, and renounced terrorism, the U.S. would have a certain
degree of negotiating flexibility with the PLO. When President Jimmy
Carter became President in 1977, he launched a significant initiative on the
part of the United States to secure a permanent settlement.114 These
initiatives culminated in the Camp David Accords.115 The Accords
generated two critical frameworks: a Framework for Peace in the Middle
East, which dealt with the status of Palestinian rights, and the Framework for
the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel.116 The first
framework agreement was founded on the stipulations in Security Council
resolutions 242 and 338.117 The United States, which had supported these
resolutions in the Security Council, now explicitly endorsed them as a
foundation for the first framework agreement of the Camp David Accords.
108
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In effect the Security Council resolutions became a cornerstone of official
U.S. foreign policy. Since Israel signed onto the Accords it expressed its
good faith endorsement of the same Security Council resolutions. Egypt and
the Palestinian representatives gave a similar endorsement to these
Resolutions. While progress was made, resulting in the peace treaty between
Egypt and Israel in 1979, little progress was made on the first framework
agreement of the Accords. However, Camp David established that both
Israel and the United States were clearly committed to respecting the
international law principles in these resolutions.
Subsequent U.S. practice has tended to retreat from the Carter
breakthrough at Camp David. For example, it may be noted that the U.S.
also refused to recognize Palestinian claims to self-determination because it
would lead to the creation of a separate state.118 In 1984, Congress codified
the provisions of Resolution 242 into law, adding as a new condition that the
PLO must renounce terrorism.119 In November 1988, the PLO issued a
declaration of independence proclaiming “the establishment of the state of
Palestine in the land of Palestine with its capital in Jerusalem.”120 This
implicitly recognized Israel’s right to exist.121 Later, Arafat, representing the
PLO, through a Palestinian communiqué, explicitly accepted Israel’s right to
exist, accepted U.N. Resolutions 242 and 338, and renounced all forms of
terrorism.122 After a series of PLO statements and clarifications, the U.S.
administration said on December 14, 1988, that Arafat had met the U.S.
conditions for a dialogue. Secretary Shultz authorized Robert Pelletreau,
U.S. Ambassador to Tunisia, as the sole channel for the dialogue. The
dialogue was suspended by President George H.W. Bush on June 20, 1990,
after Arafat refused to condemn in unequivocal terms a thwarted seaborne
terrorist attack against Israel. Meanwhile, as Palestinians sought recognition
before UNESCO and the WHO, President Bush declared that any U.N.
agency recognizing the PLO might lose U.S. funding.123 On September 10,
118
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119
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120
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1993, the same day that Israel and the PLO exchanged letters of mutual
recognition, the United States announced a resumption of the U.S.-PLO
dialogue.124
The Oslo Accords, formally designated as the Declaration of Principles
on Interim Self-Government Arrangements [for the Palestinians], were
secretly negotiated in Oslo, Norway, hosted by the Fafo Institute, and
completed on August, 20 1993. They were publicly signed in Washington,
D.C. on 13 September 1993, in the presence of Arafat, Israeli Prime Minister
Yitzhak Rabin and U.S. President Bill Clinton.125 The Accords initially
generated promising understandings that a peaceful settlement was
achievable by providing a framework for the future relations between the two
parties, for the creation of a Palestinian National Authority (PNA) and for the
withdrawal of the IDF from parts of the Gaza Strip and West Bank.126 This
arrangement was envisioned to last for five years, with the understanding
that further negotiations would be covering the issues of Jerusalem, refugees,
settlements, security, and borders.127 As nationalist political forces began to
emerge within Israel, these final status issues never became matters for
conclusive decision.128
The not-quite-obvious subtext of Oslo was the concession that a
Palestinian National Authority without an ostensible claim to sovereignty
would in effect concede that the 1988 declaration of Palestinian
independence was premature.129 On the other hand, the PNA’s future would
be tied to a final status settlement agreement. So long as Israel was reluctant
to settle these issues, there could be no final settlement and no hope of an
independent state. Moreover, tying the status of the PNA to a process of
agreement with Israel permits the Israelis to essentially exercise a veto over
Palestinian claims to statehood by simply delaying the agreement process,
124
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extending Israeli sovereignty by the de facto extension of settlement
activity.130 It thus became apparent to the Palestinians that the new
governing authorities in Israel, led by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin
Netanyahu and his Likud party, were not committed to advancing the peace
process because they opposed the creation of a Palestinian state.131 Having
structured the legal expectations in terms of Israel and the PNA, the Israeli
negotiators had a veto over claims to self-determination, independence, and
sovereignty. We now turn to the question of the possible recognition of an
independent sovereign status for the Palestinian people in light of the current
impediments.
III. THE INTERNATIONAL LAW CRITERIA OF STATEHOOD AND THE PROCESS
OF RECOGNITION
The interrelated legal issues of the “criteria of statehood” that are
recognized today, as well as the specific effects and implications of the
different aspects of recognition, are complex matters in international law.132
This complexity was aggravated after the Second World War, when under
the U.N. Charter a clearer picture of a framework of an international
constitutional system emerged.133 Statehood and recognition thus became
tied to a broader framework of issues and values.134 Among the issues is the
question of entry into the international constitutional system as well as
exclusion from it. This issue is tied to the emergence of self-determination
as a peremptory norm of international law as well as the strength accorded to
traditional principles of uti possidetis, which in general discourages
secession from a sovereign state.135
The status of Palestine draws sustenance from recent developments in
international law. It is also influenced by its rather unique history as a Class
A mandate under the United Nations. The evidence of practice under the
League demonstrates that Palestine was not subject to an alien
130
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sovereignty.136 It was considered a state on a pathway to independence.137
We explore these issues by first setting out the basic law as it currently
clarifies the definition of state and the process of recognition.
The definition of a state in international law is still influenced by
Article 1 of the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of
States.138 In this view a state is a territorially defined or definable entity. It
has a relatively stable population and its population and territory are under
the control of its own government. This entity engages or has the
competence to engage in formal and diplomatic relations with other states
and entities in the international environment.139 An aspect implicit in the
criteria of statehood is that the entity should claim that it is a State.
When we come to the question of the recognition of statehood we can see
how the international system functions on two parallel tracks.140 First,
recognition is decentralized and a matter of state sovereign discretion.141
That is to say other states may or may not recognize the entity regardless of
meeting the minima of statehood. There are circumstances in which there is
an obligation in international law not to recognize a state that has the
minimum criteria,142 if that state has sought to establish itself in violation of
the U.N. Charter.143 The other track is the recognition of a state as a member
of an international body whose membership is restricted to sovereign states
only.144 However, such recognition does not require that the sovereign
formally recognize the government of another state, although the system
provides for the recognition de facto of a state which acknowledges that a
government and a state exist.145 That recognition could be understood as
recognizing a state but not necessarily recognizing the government.
136

Wasim I. Al-Habil, Occupations, A. Diaspora, and the Design of Local Governments for a
Palestinian State (Nov. 5, 2008) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Cleveland State University)
(available at http://etd.ohiolink.edu/send-pdf.cgi/AlHabil%20Wasim.pdf?csu1226688053).
137
Id.
138
Montevideo Convention, supra note 45, art. 3.
139
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW: STATE DEFINED § 201 (1978).
140
See Thomas M. Franck, Legitimacy in the International System, 82 AM. J. INT’L L. 705,
736 (1988) (describing the formation of validity as it relates to recognition).
141
Id.
142
It is generally considered that the four criteria of statehood from the Montevideo
Convention are the minimum criteria for statehood under customary international law. See
Anonymous, China and the Principle of Self-Determination of Peoples, 6 ST. ANTONY’S INT’L
REV. 1, 79, 79–82 (2010) (“[T]he Montevideo Principles are a normative statement of the
expected attributes of a sovereign state, and thus appear to be minimum criteria.”).
143
Lloyd, supra note 132, at 767.
144
See Curtis A. Bradley & Judith G. Kelley, The Concept of International Delegation, 71
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (2008) (describing the types of international bodies that states may
grant authority).
145
Id.

364

GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.

[Vol. 40:341

Recognition by an organization like the U.N. is also influenced by the fact
that U.N. recognition is premised on the state’s ability to uphold U.N.
Charter values, including its commitment to peace.146 These principles are
more explicitly expressed in the Declaration of Friendly Principles.147 The
principles are as follows: (1) states shall refrain from the threat or use of
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state;
(2) states shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means; (3) states
shall not intervene in matters within the domestic jurisdiction of any state;
(4) states have a duty to cooperate with another in accordance with the
Charter; (5) equal rights and self-determination of peoples; (6) sovereign
equality of states; (7) states shall fulfill in good faith their obligations under
the United Nations Charter.148 With these principles in mind we review the
claim of the Palestinians to the recognition of statehood in international law.
A. Palestinian Statehood and the United Nations Mandate
The criteria of statehood that requires a body politic is generally known as
a population.149 The population issue in Palestine has been contentious since
the initiation of the Class A mandate.150 The mandate recognized a
population of Palestinians under Article 22 of the league mandate.151 This
recognition was influenced by the mandate’s purpose to secure the
population’s right to self-determination.152 However, Britain, the mandatory
power, announced a policy for Palestine to secure a homeland in Eretz Israel
for the Jewish people in the Diaspora, prior to assuming mandate
responsibilities.153 This was expressed in the Balfour Declaration.154
146

Thomas D. Grant, States Newly Admitted to the United Nations: Some Implications, 39
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 177, 183 (2000) (“As the highest international organ consisting of
states, the United Nations sets forth as its chief admissions criteria commitment to peace and
possession of the attributes of statehood.”).
147
G.A. Res 2625(XXV), supra note 88, at 122.
148
Id.
149
See generally FRANK S. HOFFMAN, THE SPHERE OF THE STATE; OR, THE PEOPLE AS A
BODY-POLITIC (1895) (discussing the original relationship between population and body
politic).
150
ASSAF LIKHOVSKI, LAW AND IDENTITY IN MANDATE PALESTINE 21–22 (2006) (the
“Mandate for Palestine” which was granted to the British by the League of Nations
accelerated a massive growth in the Jewish population adding to the diversified remnants of
the late Ottoman Empire made up of wealthy Muslims, middle class Christian merchants, and
peasants and nomads).
151
Francis A. Boyle, The Creation of the State of Palestine, 1 EUR. J. INT’L L. 301 (1990).
152
John Quigley, Palestine’s Declaration of Independence: Self-Determination and the
Right of the Palestinians to Statehood, 7 B.U. INT’L L.J. 1, 1 (1989).
153
Nils A. Butenschon, Accommodating Conflicting Claims to National Self-Determination:
the Intractable Case of Israel/Palestine, 13 INT’L J. ON MINORITY & GROUP RTS. 285, 289 n.15

2012]

RECOGNITION OF PALESTINIAN STATEHOOD

365

Balfour, in confidence, expressed the view to the British Prime Minister that
the major purpose of Article 22, namely the self-determination for
Palestinian inhabitants, could not be implemented because of the undertaking
to promote a Jewish homeland in Palestinian territory.155 As it turned out,
because Britain was not able to emerge with a successful solution to this
problem, it passed the matter on to the U.N. General Assembly.156 Article
22, which juridically established a right of self-determination for the
Palestinians, was left unimplemented.157 The critical question is how much
of this right has survived to strengthen the claim to statehood under
international law for the people of Palestine. To the extent that the
government of Israel may provide some impediments to the realization of
statehood, international law may support a weakening of the Israeli position.
One factor that has influenced Israeli perspectives is the claim that the
Palestinians are not a people for the purpose of the population requirement of
statehood.158 The evidence from careful research demonstrates a continuity
of Palestinian national identity.159 Israel has promoted the argument that
Palestinians are simply Arabs and therefore indistinguishable from other
Arabs in surrounding states.160 Some Arab nationalists have in fact
supported this view in the early efforts to create a Pan-Arab Union.161 The
strength of nation-state national identity proved too strong for this
innovation.162 We would therefore submit that Palestinians are a national
body politic, with strong national identity, and with an identity that is
continuous, particularly during the period of the U.N. Mandate and under the
U.N. Charter framework.
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The next key criterion is that the body politic must be territorially
determined or determinable.163 In general, we would suggest that boundaries
indicated in relevant U.N. Security Council resolutions established
conditions which are determined or determinable. There exist factors in the
context which suggest that Israel, a key negotiator, may have broader
territorial ambitions and this may be at the expense of Palestinian
statehood.164 A justification for Israeli territorial concerns has been
suggested by Prime Minister Netanyahu in his speech before the U.N. on
September 23, 2011.165 Essentially, Netanyahu insists that because of the
diminutive territorial status of Israel and a period of fifty years of war and
insurrection, Israel has some implicit claims to territorial enhancement to
ensure a higher level of security for the state.166 That is the practical issue.
The Prime Minister noted that many states entertain a military presence in
other states for mutual security purposes; for example, France in Africa and
the United States in Europe and Japan.167 It is possible that the Prime
Minister is also influenced by the idealism of the restoration of the historic
boundaries of ancient Israel, the Eretz Israel idea.
One pressing issue is the dynamism of territories and the requirement
under Montevideo state qualifications that, if there is to be a Palestinian
state, this state has to have agreed-upon boundaries that provide a viable
territorial base for a state.168 The apparently interminable negotiations also
formed a basis by which Israel can change the facts regarding the appropriate
reach of territory that may fall within any settlement. Essentially, one of the
ways that the territorial question can be effectually pre-determined prior to
negotiation is by a continuation and expansion of the Israeli settlement
program. Politically, the expansion of settlements is a cornerstone of the
ultranationalist program and policy in Israel.169 This policy goes forward
amidst a propaganda campaign that insists only the Israelis make concessions

163
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and that the Palestinians “take and take.”170 It is worth a reminder that the
Oslo Accords, in which Peres was a key player, involved Arafat giving up on
the 1947 U.N. boundaries for the one defined in 1967.171 In doing so, Arafat
gave up 22% of the historic Palestine;172 and Israel enlarged its territory on
the historic Palestine from owning 56% to owning 78%.173
The Obama Administration has insisted on a freeze on settlement building
projects on Palestinian land.174 Netanyahu agreed to a ten-month freeze in
order to encourage the initiation of talks.175 However, during these ten months
construction was the same as in the previous ten months.176 The Obama
Administration has pressed Netanyahu to give another two months for the
freeze.177 The U.S. administration has had no influence on Netanyahu’s
settlement policies.178 Moreover, the American administration’s position is
weakened by the pressure of the American pro-Israel lobby.179
Why is Netanyahu reluctant to stop the settlement expansion? The longer
it continues, the more intractable the foundation of a viable peace becomes.
In fact, the settlement strategy may be meant to be a deal breaker. Why
would Netanyahu be interested in telling the United States he supports a
settlement to the conflict while his activities and behavior all point in the
direction of a strategy designed to continue fighting indefinitely with no final
170
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conclusion, except one that is created on the ground? Settlements are
creating and contain the capacity for re-writing the map, making it
impossible for future Israeli authorities to undo the map. Netanyahu has
refused to give any assurance about the settlement freeze.180
Netanyahu rules with a complex coalition of ultranationalist interests.
The only legitimate boundaries of the state of Israel, according to them, are
not defined by international law but by the history and antiquity of Jewish
culture.181 This point was also stressed by Balfour.182 The historical
boundaries of Israel, therefore, include Ancient Sumeria and Judea.183 In
short, the only acceptable boundaries are those of Eretz Israel (a greater
Israel).184 In this Israel, there is no room for Palestinians. The boundaries of
greater Israel direct us to another principle: the idea that there will never be a
Palestinian state.185 It has long been accepted in ultranationalist circles that
the Palestinians are not a real national entity or people and thus, as the
argument goes, the Palestinians may not claim on the basis of national
identity that they are people qualified to carry the mantle of statehood.186
When we come to the question of the governance of the Palestinian
entity, this represents a more complex issue. Under the Oslo Accords, a
Palestinian National Authority was set up.187 The agreement left final status
issues as matters to be negotiated between Israel and the PNA.188 This
implicitly left the PNA with a certain measure of internal autonomy, and
some measure of external competence, but the Oslo Accords suggest that
final status includes Palestinian statehood. This understanding carries the
assumption that the PNA does not claim full sovereign independent status
180
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since the status must be negotiated with Israel. Clearly, to establish a
promising claim for statehood the Palestinians would have to repudiate any
understanding that statehood is conditioned by an Israeli veto. The veto
would not be exercised in any formal sense. It could be reflected simply in a
strategy that is unwilling or reluctant to achieve a settlement. In this sense, if
Palestinian statehood is tied to the conclusion of an agreement with Israel,
and Israelis are reluctant to conclude, their conduct amounts to a veto if it is
also claimed that statehood cannot be considered by the U.N. or the
international community unless there is an Israeli agreement. The strategy of
seeking recognition of statehood must address this question as well.
Additionally, we suggest later in this article that more should be done to
strengthen the framework of governance internally and externally and
including the constitutional foundations of a future Palestinian State.
It could be argued that Resolution 181 at least implies the idea that
international law supports the notion of “an Arab state” as part of the Partition
Plan.189 It could also be argued that the Security Council resolutions
recognizing the West Bank and Gaza as Palestinian territories are de jure
recognition that the boundaries of the Palestinian people are determinable and
that the U.N. Security Council resolutions provide the baseline for determining
the boundaries. These resolutions form the foundation of negotiations relating
to the Oslo Accords, which essentially involved an acceptance by the parties of
these boundaries.190 This means that Palestinians have already conceded a
huge portion of Palestinian land to Israel to secure agreement to settlement.
From the standpoint of the traditional criteria of what constitutes a state,191
Palestinian lands for a state are determinable.192 Second, although Israel
occupies those lands, the occupancy vests no title in the occupier.193 The
trumping legal principle is the legally binding Security Council resolutions.194
189
Eli E. Hertz, U.N. Resolution 181 – The Partition Plan: A “Green Light” for Jewish
Statehood – A ‘Dead’ Blueprint for Peace, MYTHS AND FACTS (2009), http://mythsandfacts.
org/conflict/10/resolution-181.pdf.
190
Louis Kriesberg, The Relevance of Reconciliation Actions in the Breakdown of Israeli–
Palestinian Negotiations, 2000, 27 PEACE & CHANGE 546, 546–71 (2002); see also Sara Roy,
Why Peace Failed: An Oslo Autopsy, 100 CURRENT HIST. 651 (2002).
191
Montevideo Convention, supra note 45, art. 1. Article 1 says that states should possess
“a) a permanent population; b) a defined territory; c) government; and d) capacity to enter into
relations with the other states.”
192
GUDRUN KRÄMER, A HISTORY OF PALESTINE: FROM THE OTTOMAN CONQUEST TO THE
FOUNDING OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL 1 (Gudrun Kramer trans., 2008) (describing how Palestine’s
once-amorphous borders have given way to a defined territory).
193
Id. at 300, 306 (describing the intentional importation of illegal Jewish immigrants, thus
undermining the legitimacy of the occupation title; and describing the U.N. Resolution
envisioning a Jewish and a Palestinian entity).
194
Id. at 306.

370

GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.

[Vol. 40:341

The second criterion of statehood is that there should be a permanent
(Palestinian) population.195 There is a permanent Palestinian population in
the West Bank and Gaza.196 What makes a final settlement complex is that
there are now millions of (absentee) Palestinians whose citizenship rights
were abrogated by Israeli legislation and administrative measures.197 Still,
we can conclude that, at a minimum, there is a Palestinian population inside
the territories occupied by Israel that qualifies as a permanent population.198
The third criterion of statehood is having in place a functioning
government.199 This issue is somewhat more problematic, because the
Palestinian Authority (PA) was created as an interim entity and not a
permanent governing authority.200 Here, the Palestinians, by drafting a valid
constitution and creating a government under that constitution, could meet
the criteria of statehood unambiguously.201 The PNA does meet some of the
criteria relating to the capacity to enter into relations with other states.202
The degree of recognition that Palestinian entities have received suggests
that the Palestinian leadership is capable of discharging these obligations.
The PNA has relations with at least 140 other states203 that could qualify as
meeting the minimum requirements of diplomacy.204 Additionally, the
observer status of the PLO at the U.N.205 and the degree of the PNA and the
PLO’s participation in international organizations,206 significantly enhances
195
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the claim that a future government has the capacity to enter into relations
with other states and entities in the international environment.
These are the criteria indicated in the Montevideo Convention on the
Rights and Duties of States.207 Since the adoption of the U.N. Charter, there
has been a modest change in the notion of sovereignty as the criterion of the
legal personality of the state.208 That change requires that a state as a
sovereign entity is able and willing to accept the rights, as well as the
obligations, of a state under the charter of the United Nations.209 Since this
would include the fundamental purpose and values behind the U.N. Charter,
it would be appropriate that the constitution of a Palestinian state and its
practices reflect on issues of international peace and security, commitment to
the rule of law, a commitment to fundamental human rights, and a
commitment to global security and democracy.210 These latter criteria are
ones that bring an element of “authority” to the expression of sovereignty.
It could be argued that Israeli sovereignty is somewhat diminished by its
unwillingness to adopt the constitutional guidelines of Resolution 181.211 It
has been commonly assumed that Resolution 181 provided the international
legal imprimatur for the creation of the Israeli state and an Arab state.212
Resolution 181 contained certain guidelines as to what the political structure
of rights and duties of the future states should encompass.213 The Israeli
leadership took the green light of the Resolution 181 and declared its
independence.214 The Declaration was a document that complied fully with
the guidelines of Resolution 181.215 However, although there was an intent
that the Declaration should be the inspiration for the new Israeli Constitution,
such a Constitution did not emerge.216 This means that Israel effectually
refused to adopt its own declaration of independence as containing legally
binding prescriptive norms.217 In this sense, Israeli objections to Palestinian
statehood would appear to be objections to the mandate of international law
Oct. 19, 2012).
207
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itself. Our sense is that the only stumbling block on the pathway to the
recognition of Palestinian statehood would be the United States exercising a
veto over the process in the Security Council. This would be an ill-advised
vote, however, it is one that the Palestinians must strategically seek to
overcome or minimize through the use of international provisions such as
“Uniting for Peace,” which we will discuss in a latter part of this Article.218
Currently, there are more or less 114 countries that already recognize
Palestinian statehood.219 Such recognition is in the first instance a matter of
state sovereignty exercised bilaterally.220 The nature of these agreements
gives an advantage to the Palestinians for them to try to secure an
overwhelming bilateral commitment for a recognition of Palestinian
sovereignty. Already, important Latin American states have given their
commitments. Additionally, it could also be advantageous for Palestinians to
seek recognition of their statehood in regional international organizations
such as the League of Arab States, the African Union, OAS, European Union
etc. Regional recognition would be politically efficient for the Palestinians
to develop their constitution and constitute their government.221 With this
background, it may be vastly more difficult for the United States to exercise
a veto in the face of an overwhelming global consensus.
It would seem to be clear that the recognition of Palestinian statehood
must meet the Montevideo criteria of statehood222 and more under the U.N.
Charter. It must be noted that Montevideo was modified by post World War
II developments regarding the criteria of statehood in international law.223
The first issue is the recognition of their claims to territory. First, U.N.
General Assembly Resolution 181 develops the partition of land.224 The
boundaries indicated in that resolution were the boundaries adopted by Israel
to define its territorial space.225 Since the Palestinians were not an organized
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entity at that time,226 they were not in a position to either adopt the U.N.
partition scheme or even to repudiate it. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that,
as we had earlier discussed, Israel’s boundaries were partially defined and
Palestinian boundaries were determinable in this sense. These determinable
boundaries would meet the criterion of territoriality for State recognition.
After the 1967 war, Israel occupied Gaza and the West Bank.227 It still
occupies those territories. However, Israel has agreed to Resolutions 242
and 338; and the Palestinians have agreed to the territorial dispensation
indicated in these resolutions. This means that Palestinians, in effect, accept
less territory than originally envisioned in Resolution 181. Boundaries may
be redefined by agreement. This means that Israel needs an agreement that
will accommodate its settlement activity in Palestinian territory. In short,
settlement activity flies in the face of U.N. Resolutions 242 and 338, and is
therefore unlawful. Here the lawfulness of the boundaries under these
resolutions is grounded in the Security Council’s competence to make
binding international law.228 The unlawfulness can be cured by an agreement
between Israel and the Palestinians. For such an agreement or understanding
to have legal efficacy, it would probably have to be sanctioned or approved
by the Security Council.229 One final point—the matter that does not make it
into the front lines of negotiation-is the deep belief of Israeli ultranationalists
that international law boundaries in the context of this conflict are not
legitimate. They use the legitimate boundaries of Israel as defined by ancient
history, in which the ancient state of Israel was sovereign over lands, now
claimed to be Palestinian.230 This is a deeply held belief;231 and it may well
be that, so long as the extreme ideology of ultranationalism controls the
government of Israel, there will be no final settlement that involves territorial
determinations incompatible with the Eretz Israel idea.
The next element of statehood is the element of governance.232 It would
seem that the agreement to create the PA with a degree of internal autonomy
goes a long way toward the requirement that there be a discernible form of
governance with lines of authority. However, it has been clearly understood
226
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that the PA is not really meant to be a governing body in an international
sense.233 This means that the PLO and its allies must reconstitute the PNA in
the form of a recognizable government, with a working draft constitution,
and with a framework of transparency, responsibility, and accountability. It
would also be appropriate that such an organization draft a constitution that
approximates international standards in order to show that the Palestinian
governing authority is willing, ready, and able to meet its international
responsibilities under the U.N. Charter. It bears notice that the U.N. partition
plan stipulated that the constitutions of both Arab and Jewish states would
guarantee “all persons equal and nondiscriminatory rights in civil, political,
economic and religious matters and the enjoyment of human rights and
fundamental freedoms, including freedom of religion, language, speech and
publication, education, assembly and association.”234
The declaration of the establishment of Israel indicated that the new state
“will uphold the full social and political equality of all its citizens without
distinction of religion, race, or sex.”235 After this promising start, the
declaration was never adopted by the Knesset; and no efforts were made to
draft a constitution along these lines.236 In our view, both Israelis and
Palestinians would have benefited by establishing the Israel with a constitution
based on this declaration. It should be noted that the Knesset delegated the
task of drafting a constitution to its Constitution, Law, and Justice Committee,
which has never presented the Knesset with a draft constitution.237
B. The Relevance of Recent Case Law
Case law frequently provides the particulars of the background context
within which the nuances of decisions emerge on the complex question of
the validity of claims to statehood in international law. The operational norm
reflects complexity in the sense that these norms are in ostensible conflict.
International law protects the territorial integrity of the nation-state and does
not in general favor claims for self-determination and independence that
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require the breakup of the state.238 The circumstances under which secession
may succeed tend to be fairly situation specific.239
There seem to be two salient formulas relevant to this context.240 The
first presents a unified state in which one part of the state (defined by
territory or the identity of the citizens) seeks to secede from the union and
form a separate state.241 The consensus seems to be that, unless there is
extreme ostracism or persecution of the separatist group by the unified state,
secession should not be permitted.242
The Supreme Court of Canada, in the case Reference re Secessions of
Quebec,243 analyzed the scope of the right to self-determination with regards
of the province of Quebec. The court considered the questions put to it
concerning whether the legislature might under international law have the
right to unilateral secession from Canada.244 In an exhaustive analysis of the
right to self-determination in international law the court ruled that in effect
the population of Quebec was not an oppressed people and has not
experienced attacks on their physical integrity or the massive violation of
fundamental rights.245 The court saw the international right of selfdetermination as being confined to situations of former colonies where there
is oppression or situations of foreign military occupation.246 As indicated
above, the claims related to Quebec for the possibility of unilateral secession
were rejected by the Supreme Court of Canada because the claims of the
Quebecois were not sustained by any sense of repression or disidentification
by the state, which is in fact a rule of law-governed states.247 This decision
supports the legal position of Palestinian statehood in the sense that it
238
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239
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240
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clarifies specific circumstances under which self-determination and secession
are valid in international law. These circumstances favor Palestinian rights.
The ICJ upheld Kosovo’s unilateral claim for independence and statehood
under international law.248 There, particular facts concerning Kosovo
seemed to have influenced the determination that Kosovo could secede from
Yugoslav sovereignty. Kosovo was an autonomous region under the 1974
Yugoslavian constitution.249 As the constitution eroded, Serbian repression
and notorious discrimination characterized the position of the Kosovo
majority.250 In fact, international intervention was influenced by the prospect
of a program of massive ethnic cleansing of the region.251 This established a
provisional form of governance under U.N. authority.252 A further factor that
supported the validity of the declaration of Kosovo independence was that
negotiations for an internal settlement toward a final status seemed to be
carrying on interminably and aimlessly.253
The situation in Kosovo and the occupied territories is similar to the
Palestinian situation in that, in both cases, the framework for continued
negotiations toward a final settlement was actually taking place under the
authority of U.N. Security Council resolutions. In Kosovo, the interim
government was directly created by the Security Council resolution;254 in the
context of the occupied territories of Palestine, the Oslo Accords—which
came under the broad authority of U.N. Security Council resolutions—also
created the Palestinian National Authority as an interim institution of
governance.255 In Kosovo, the International Court of Justice held that the
representatives of the Kosovar people were not limited in their residual claim
to sovereignty and independence by the U.N. Security Council resolutions.256
Similarly, U.N. General Assembly resolutions would seem to strengthen the
residual competence of the Palestinian people to declare their sovereignty

248

Alexander Orakhelashvili, Statehood, Recognition and the United Nations System: A
Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Kosovo, 12 MAX PLANCK Y.B. UNITED NATIONS L.
1, 2 (2008).
249
Id.; Kosovo, CIA WORLD FACTBOOK, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/geos/kv.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2012).
250
Orakhelashvili, supra note 248, at 2–3.
251
See Ruth Wedgwood, Editorial Comment: NATO’s Kosovo Intervention: NATO’s
Campaign in Yugoslavia, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 828, 829–30 (1999) (explaining that the Serbian
campaign of ethnic cleansing was one reason given for NATO’s intervention in Kosovo).
252
S.C. Res. 1244, para. 10, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1244 (June 10, 1999).
253
Orakhelashvili, supra note 248, at 19.
254
S.C. Res. 1244, supra note 252, para. 10.
255
Daniel Benoliel & Ronen Perry, Israel, Palestine, and the ICC, 32 MICH. J. INT’L L. 73,
82 (2010).
256
Orakhelashvili, supra note 248, at 18.

2012]

RECOGNITION OF PALESTINIAN STATEHOOD

377

and independence.257 Unlike the Quebecois, the Palestinian claim also does
not involve an issue of secession of titled territory from Israel; because Israel
has no sovereign title to the territories it occupies.258
We would submit that the factual background and reasoning of the courts
in the discussed cases provides support for Palestinian claims to statehood
and independence under international law. In the case of Kosovo the court
did not include a finding of Kosovo’s statehood but what makes the case
relevant to the Palestinian situation, is that the governance of Kosovo at the
time of its declaration of independence was set up under U.N. authority with
provisional institutions of self-governance.259 Additionally, Serbia’s claim to
territorial authority over Kosovo could be seen as stronger than Israeli claims
to prevent the recognition of Palestinian statehood. Kosovo was territorially
a part of Serbia, whereas Israeli claims over Palestinian territories are those
of an occupying entity.260 It would therefore appear that the case law from
the International Court of Justice and the Canadian Supreme Court favors the
lawfulness of the claim of the Palestinian people to the recognition of
statehood, independence, and sovereignty.
C. Repressive and Discriminatory Behaviors of the State of Israel
Resolution 181, also known as the Partition Plan, established criteria for
citizenship without regard to religion or ethnicity:
Palestinian citizens residing in Palestine outside the City of
Jerusalem, as well as Arabs and Jews who, not holding
Palestinian citizenship, reside in Palestine outside the City of
Jerusalem shall, upon the recognition of independence, become
citizens of the State in which they are resident and enjoy full
civil and political rights.261
Subsequent Israeli legislation and practice has ignored these issues. Those
practices generated a huge Palestinian refugee crisis.262 Most recently, Prime
257
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Minister Netanyahu wanted to affirm the validity of internal Israeli practices
on citizenship and statelessness by having the Palestinian National Authority
agree that Israel (from the perspective of the Palestinians) is a “Jewish
state.”263
A brief reference should be made to the laws dealing with a preference
for persons of Jewish identity. The Law of Return (Amendment No. 2),
1970 (amending the Law of Return (1950)) effectually defines who is a Jew
and, by implication, who is not.264 Greater specificity is give to these
distinctions with regard to Palestinians in the Absentee Property Law of
1950, the Entering into Israel Law of 1952 and Israeli National Law of
1952.265 The Absentee Property Law defined the mass of Palestinian Arabs
as “absentees” from territories that Israel conquered in the 1948 war.266 The
law denies them the citizenship rights envisioned in Resolution 181 and also
denies them the rights to their properties inside Israel.267 The status of
“absentee” is inherited as well, meaning that children of Palestinian Arabs
will also be considered “absentee.”268
The absentee law simultaneously affects civic status and land rights. This
issue with respect to land rights is supplemented by legislation and
administrative practices which are supported by Israeli basic laws.269 Four
cornerstones make up the legal basis of Israeli land policy;270 the Basic Law
establishing the Israel Land Administration;271 the Israel Lands Law;272 the
Palestinian Refugees, 5 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 317, 327 (2004); see also Elia Zureik,
Palestinian Refugees and Peace, 24 J. PALESTINE STUD. 5, 5–17 (1994) (discussing the
refugees and unresolved political issues that resulted from the 1948 and 1967 wars); Kurt R.
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Israel Land Administration;273 and the Covenant between the State of Israel
and the World Zionist Organization (Jewish National Fund) (1961).274 The
net result of these laws is that non-Jews are excluded by law from 92.6% of
the land of pre-1967 Israel.275 These and other administrative measures have
created a complex background generating great sensitivity and salience to the
settlement activity in Palestinian lands since 1948 and after 1967.
In addition, Israel has a formidable array of defensive and emergency
regulations so that the state is administered under a dual military-civilian
system.276 The defense emergency regulations, which were inherited from
Britain, include the power to detain, the power to deport, the power to take
possession of land, the power to forfeit and demolish property, and the power
to declare closed areas.277 These were supplemented by the Foundation of
Legislation Law of 1980, which strengthened the powers of the state and
weakened the rights of Palestinians.278
Under the authority of this arsenal of complex laws, the critical question
is of course the status of Palestinians in the territories that came under Israeli
control after the 1967 war. In 1967, Israel attacked Syria and occupied the
Golan Heights.279 It also occupied the West Bank in Gaza, and the Sinai
Peninsula up to the Suez Canal.280 Technically international law does not
validate the acquisition of territory by the use of force.281 On the other hand,
the occupancy of such territory, over time, may generate new facts and new
expectations if the legal statuses of the occupancy (and those who suffer
occupancy) are not appropriately clarified.282 The Palestinians have
reasserted their claim to statehood covering the territories now occupied by
Israel—namely, Gaza and the West Bank.283 The Israelis, while negotiating,
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have been doing so in an interminable manner.284 It is possible there are
interests in Israel that see continuous negotiation as an opportunity to
incrementally change facts on the ground, by engaging in settlement activity,
strategically placing roads for exclusive Israeli use,285 as well as limiting
Palestinian development and civil rights.
For example, the West Bank aquifer is a major water resource.286 Israelis
use approximately 800 liters of water per day while Palestinians are allowed to
use only an approximate of 200 liters per day.287 Israel prohibits Palestinians
from drilling into the West Bank aquifer without permits.288 Palestinian
construction of catchment basins to collect rainwater is prohibited.289 A wide
variety of goods are deemed to be “war goods” (such as sewing machines);
perishable Palestinian exports are delayed so that they are destroyed.290
Moreover, income to Palestinians is restricted so that Palestinian incomes have
to be more than twenty times less than that of Israelis.291 Israel limits
entrepreneurial activity that may compete with Israelis’ and disrupts
Palestinian schooling.292
The system of strategic roads has made
communication a nightmare.293 The Israeli policy of targeted assassinations
has focused on eliminating educated and moderate Palestinians, making it
difficult to create a competent government authority.294 Israel controls
284
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airspace and prevents Palestinian fishing operations in the Mediterranean.295
Tens of thousands of homes have been demolished.296 Hundreds of thousands
of fruit and nut trees have been destroyed.297
The continuance of the conflict escalates tensions and, in turn, accelerates
inter-group hostility between the Palestinians and Israelis. One of the
significant problems of inter-group escalating tensions is the propensity to
shape human behaviors in terms of the perspectives of racism.298 This is a
problem that cuts both ways. In Israel, domestic critics seriously lament “the
filthy wave of racism that is engulfing us.”299 The charge that Israel generates
strong racist constituencies is both serious as well as a matter of extreme
concern to the Israeli authorities. The link between racism and the occupation
is indicated in the actual practices of sustaining the occupation itself. A recent
book titled The Occupation of the Territories is summarized in Avnery’s
newsletter. The book recounts the testimonies of ordinary Israeli soldiers
dealing with the daily and nightly life of occupation. According to Avnery,
There are accounts of nocturnal incursions into quiet
Palestinian villages as exercises—breaking into random houses
where there were no “suspects”, terrorizing children, women
and men, creating mayhem in the village—all this to “train” the
soldiers. There are stories about the humiliation of passers-by
at the checkpoints (“Clean up the checkpoint and you will get
your keys back!”), casual harassment (“He started to complain,
so I hit him in the face with the butt of my weapon!”). Every
testimony is meticulously documented: time, place, unit.
According to Avnery, the matter-of-factness and the effort to avoid
outrageous incidents strengthen the credibility of the book.
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The intention of the book is not to uncover atrocities and show
the soldiers as monsters. It aims to present a situation: the ruling
over another people, with all the high-handed arbitrariness that
this necessarily entails, humiliation of the occupied, corruption
of the occupier. According to the editors, it is quite impossible
for the individual soldier to make a difference. He is just a cog
in a machine that is inhuman by its very nature.300
These reports should also be understood in the context of right-wing elements
in Israel seeking to depreciate the civic status of Arab citizens. This includes
“loyalty oaths,” “religious edicts” that forbid Jews from renting apartments to
Arabs, demonstrations in Bat Yam calling “for the expulsion of all Arabs,” and
Tel Aviv’s “Hatikva quarter demand[ing] the expulsion of refugees and
foreign workers.”301 Jews have been millennial victims of racism, and there is
a great sensitivity to the concern that some elements in Israel promote a racist
agenda. The right-wing racists seek to challenge the “unequaled humanity” of
the Judaic tradition.302 The religion “demands the treatment of ‘Gerim’
(foreigners living in Israel) as Israelites, because you were foreigners in the
land of Egypt.”303 It should also be noted that foreign women are critical to the
Jewish biblical history. Bathsheba, the mother of Solomon, had been the wife
of a Hittite.304 Her later husband, David, was the descendent of Ruth, who was
a Moabite.305 One of Israel’s great kings—King Ahab—was married to a
Phoenician.306 Our sense is that the occupation is a major contributor to the
disturbing emergence of racism in Israel. In this sense, Israel would benefit as
much as the Palestinians from a just settlement.
When the list of depredations is viewed in the aggregate, there is a sense
that the occupying authority wants life to be an impossible struggle for the
residents of the West Bank and Gaza.307 Palestinian resistance is equated
with terrorism308 but, if they resist with non-violence they are not a serious
300
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negotiating party or, the strategies of non-violence are simply viewed as
weakness, permitting the Israeli side to up the ante.309 There are, of course,
perspectives from the Palestinian side and perspectives from the Israeli side.
Any balanced account in law must certainly acknowledge the reality of these
perspectives. One balancing factor to be considered is the Palestinian
National Authority’s relationship with Hamas.310 The ambiguous nature of
this relationship undermines the authority of the PNA; and the anti-Semitic
posturing of Hamas challenges the willingness of other states to recognize a
Palestinian state having ties to such an organization.311
Another balancing factor is the complexity of Israeli society, which has a
courageous community of human rights activists.312 This community (which
supports the individual rights of Israelis as well as Palestinians) has gone
mostly unheard in recent years, as the powerful ultranationalist establishment
came to the fore with strong support from religious nationalists.313 The Israeli
establishment is often supported uncritically by some fifty-two314 U.S.-based
Jewish groups, sometimes described as “The Lobby.”315 While these groups
apparently work to support “Israel,” the reality is that these groups largely
channel money in support of the Israeli nationalist cause.316 Such distribution
motivational aspects behind the use of terrorism in Palestine, and the groups which have used
it); see also Tomis Kapitan, The Terrorism of ‘Terrorism,’ in TERRORISM AND INTERNATIONAL
JUSTICE 47, 55 (James Sterba ed., 2003) (discussing the history of terrorism in Palestine);
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of outside funding serves to marginalize center-left opinions in Israel.317 The
influence of these groups is astonishing,318 and suggests great complexity and
concern about U.S. involvement in the Middle East negotiations.
One thing is clear—the system of occupancy administration falls radically
short of the responsibilities of belligerent occupancy under international law
and significantly undermines humanitarian and human rights law. This
weakens claims by the Israeli authorities for continued occupation of Gaza
and the West Bank. The influence of the Israeli ultranationalists on the
American neo-con political interests was reflected in the vastly ambitious
doctrine of the “Clean Break.”319 This doctrine, which sought to reshape the
entire state structure of the Middle East, in effect, implies that the Palestinian
problem in Israel is a sideshow.320 The Clean Break Doctrine promoted the
idea of regime changes for the dictators of the Middle East on the basis that
one could not make peace with authoritarian despots.321 Regime change
favored democracy. Events in Tunis and Egypt and other parts of the Middle
East, which indicate strong popular demands for democracy, made
Netanyahu wish that they had not taken him so seriously regarding the
democracy issue.322 Presumably he misses the stability of an authoritarian
friend like Mubarak.
On the other hand, deeply rooted in the Israeli ultranationalist agenda is
the idea of a return to an exclusively Jewish state without Arabs; that state’s
boundaries being the boundaries of Eretz Israel.323 The current state of
negotiations has floundered on the rock of Israeli settlement activity. The
U.S. has now admitted that it is incapable of generating inducements to
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Netanyahu for a settlement freeze.324 However, the freeze is the essential
precondition for Palestinian cooperation in the negotiation process.325 It is
unclear what further steps the U.S. can take short of putting the squeeze on
the Lobby, a squeeze that is beyond the capability of the Obama
Administration.326 This has renewed the Palestinian interest in looking at an
alternative strategy to secure its claim to statehood.
There are some who propagate the notion that there is no such thing as a
“Palestinian.”327 By refusing to permit Palestinians their identity, these
individuals are laying the groundwork for rejecting the Palestinians’ claim to
be a “people” under international law for the purposes of selfdetermination.328 Some hold that the Palestinians are simply Arabs (and are
therefore indistinguishable from the Arabs of contiguous states).329 Under
international law, there is the recognition of rights of entities other than
states; and this includes the right of a people to self-determination.
As we have previously discussed, the right of self-determination has
evolved by virtue of a framework of complex international agreements and
international practices.330 However, there is not a clear-cut, formal definition
of the idea of “peoples.” Given this degree of unclarity, there is sufficient
identity, coherence, and visible indicators of who a Palestinian is that, as a
practical matter, it would be quite counter-intuitive to regard the Palestinians
not as a people entitled to self-determination under international law. The
nature of the right of self-determination is expressed in a multitude of
international instruments like Article 1(2)331 and Article 55332 of the U.N.
Charter, which express the idea of respect for the principle of selfdetermination of peoples, the ICCPR333 and the ICESCR,334 both stating that
“[a]ll peoples have the right to self-determination,” the U.N. Declaration on
Friendly Relations, which also affirms the principle of self-determination of
peoples and stipulates that every state has a duty to respect this right in

324
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accordance with the provisions of the Charter,335 the 1993 World Conference
on Human Rights, which adopts the Vienna Declaration and Program of
Action336 stressing its affirmation of the right of self-determination of all
peoples, and the Helsinki Final Act, which also stresses the salience of the
right to self-determination.337 It seems to be clear that the processes by
which Israel exercises occupancy control over the Palestinians undermines
most of the central elements of the scope of the right of self-determination.
D. Contemporary International Relations
To some extent, Israel achieved statehood by first gaining support in the
international community as a proto-state (especially by using formal legal
tools like treaties) and then by unilaterally acting with sovereignty as a
realized state (particularly by throwing off the paternalistic yoke of the U.N.
requirements and by going to war with the neighboring militants threatening
the new state’s borders and existence).338 The ruling authority of Israel was
able to do this because it had the force of global opinion behind it.339 What
seems to threaten the present leadership of Israel (who oppose the creation of
a Palestinian state) so much right now is the wave of global support for the
emerging state of Palestine.340
Looking at the example of Israel’s achievement of statehood341 (in partial
defiance of U.N. requirements342), it would seem that one clear sign of selfdetermination is that the proto-government makes decisions in the best interest
of the polity, whether or not these are the prescribed rules of formulation set
out by the controlling entities in international law. Nevertheless, the protoPalestine ruling authority must make the correct evaluations of what is an
“assertion of sovereignty” and what is, frankly, detestable under contemporary
international law standards. The proto-state, while it must achieve sufficient
independence to earn the qualification of “self-determined,” is very vulnerable
335
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to international opinion. Indeed, the fact that it must “earn” recognition
(including independence) illuminates the forceful role of foreign opinion and
international expectations in contemporary international law.
While
international relations do not directly make law, they do frame the issues for
the interpretation of relevant law standards.
Over the last few months the Palestinians have been deciding whether to
seek full membership at the Security Council, or to petition the General
Assembly for an enhanced observer status.343 In January 2010, the
Palestinian Foreign Minister, Riad Malki, declared his intention to seek U.N.
recognition of Palestinian statehood in September 2011. He also stated that
he is currently lobbying for supporting votes worldwide.344 However, the
U.N. route is not necessarily an easy process. As we will discuss in more
detail, because the General Assembly can only vote on membership based on
a positive recommendation from the Security Council, in order to obtain
U.N. membership, Minister Malki would have to first gain support from the
Security Council.
We have described the scenario of separatists who are granted the right to
self-determination under international law. That is one way that global
opinion may frame the situation in the occupied Palestinian territories.
Another scenario presents a framework unsupported by international law—
that of South Africa, a unified state, in which the pre-colonial residents of the
state are ruled by the colonists in a disadvantageous way that denies the
inherent dignity and self-determination of the pre-colonial citizens.345 Here,
the consensus seems to be that, even with extreme persecution of one group,
the state should remain united, but there should be a change in the laws and
the leadership of the state to enforce the equality of all citizens under a single
set of laws.346 However, there are distinct differences between the former
apartheid situation in South Africa and that of the occupied Palestinian
territories.347
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First, the Jewish settlers have effectively ousted the former natives from
the most valuable land (with historical monuments, urban development, and
access to significant resources like water);348 and the leadership of Israel
seems intractably set against welcoming Palestinians into a secular state of
Israel as citizens and equals.349 Under international law, it is the sovereign
right of Israel to determine who may become a citizen, who may be a
resident, and what type of laws will govern the people within its borders.350
Unless the Israeli polity itself changes these standards in constitutive acts (or
violates human rights obligations to the extent that international entities
pierce Israel’s sovereignty), external forces cannot transform Israel into a
unified, secular, equal rights-based state.
Second, the ousting of the Palestinians through military combat seems to
have effectively settled Israel’s legal claim to the land seized in the 1948 war
and subsequent military combat fought over Jewish settlers’ lands. As a
result, Israel has continued to gain land and extend its constructive borders
through combat.351 Israeli settlements in Palestinian territories provoke
protests and violent reactions of Palestinians, who, having no state, do not
have a clear right to defend themselves militarily under international law.352
If they claim such a right they risk being characterized as terrorists. This is a
unique situation, produced as a result of evolving international law regarding
non-state combatants.353 It would seem to require further evolution of
international law, to provide status for peoples who have no entity with
sufficient international personality to protect and provide for them. Given
that the state is the most important viable juridical personality in
contemporary international law for the protection of peoples and individuals
under duress from another state, and that no state contiguous to the borders
of the PNA (especially Israel) has provided this, as one scholar has put it,
“[m]aintaining the occupation is clearly unsustainable because of the raging
violence and the continuation of the state of war . . . .”354
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IV. INTERESTS OF THE PARTIES
While it is clearly in our interest to suggest that respect for the
international rule of law (especially regarding human rights norms) is best
for all, we address the particular parties individually as follows.
A. Palestinian Interests in a Two-State Solution
The advantages of a recognized state begin with the idea that a duly
recognized state would sharpen the legal question of Israel’s continued
occupation. The occupation in the face of recognized statehood would be
tantamount to the occupation of territory by the use of force in violation of
U.N. Charter Article 2(4).355 Thus, Resolution 242, which calls for the end
of occupation, in light of legally recognized statehood, would add to the
illegality of occupation by the assumption that the IDF’s occupancy is now
that of an aggressor.356 A fully recognized state would make it difficult for
Israel to negotiate or discuss violations of international law, which is a matter
of state responsibility. Additionally, the creation of a regularly constituted
parliament, administrative agencies, and courts, the organization of the
professions with state regulation and backing, and the organization of
education and social services should all hopefully progress with the security
of established and definable institutions of authoritative and controlling
decision-making. Most importantly for the Palestinians, the structures of
good governance require transparency, responsibility, and accountability,
and a respect for the rule of law.357 To the extent that the PNA is relatively
informal at present,358 it suggests that influence may be generated by third
party forces that may be partial to strategies of coercion and violence.359
Thus, the benefits of open and transparent good governance could be a
critical dimension of political responsibility in maintaining peace and
security. It is usually where governance is unformulated and loosely
organized that there is an opportunity for penetration by terroristic
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operatives.360 The establishment of a state would create a state constitutional
ideology that stresses the respect for human rights and fundamental
freedoms. All Palestinians would benefit from this. The following table
below provides a current statistical indication of the costs to the Palestinians
of the current occupation policy and the value of sovereign status.361

The recognition of a sovereign Palestinian state would improve the
negotiating stature of the Palestinian negotiators. At present, negotiations
are structured around those of a sovereign State and its officials (Israel) and
those of an entity which does not have the functioning diplomatic standing of
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a sovereign State. This suggests that the bargaining and negotiating structure
is an asymmetrical one and that the Palestinians are the weaker entity in the
process of agreement making. They would still have to work through central
issues for the purpose of a complete peaceful settlement with the state of
Israel. Those issues include Jerusalem, settlements, borders and related
issues, water, refugees, political prisoners, missing persons and the remains
of fallen persons, issues between the state of Palestine and the state of Israel,
economic and trade relations, monetary affairs and claims resolution.362
These negotiations implicate the complex map of Israel and Palestine
including settlements, the wall and other issues of geographic complexity.
The following map provides a guide.363
MAP IMPLICATING PALESTINIAN INTERESTS SUCH AS THE WALL,
SETTLEMENTS AND EAST JERUSALEM
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B. Israeli Interests in a Two-State Solution
Israeli interests in the recognition of a Palestinian state are complex. We
are rejecting the idea that the majority of Israelis will opt for a state of
continual insurrectionary, low-level conflict that threatens to undermine the
political development of appropriate institutions of good governance in the
Palestinian territories. It is therefore in Israel’s interest that a recognition of
a Palestinian state with good governance principles, which will diminish the
prospect of that governing authority being influenced by shadowy third party
forces. This type of government will provide the Israelis with the highest
level of security, which they see as an important part of settlement. In short,
being freed from the shackles of occupation and constitutional good
governance for the Palestinians with the prospect of enterprise could produce
a stable and important political entity that would significantly stabilize the
prospects for peace and security in the region. The alternative is simply to
deny any right to self-determination, realizing that this will have destructive
consequences in the long term.
There are two fundamental Israeli interests in the success of a negotiated
settlement with the Palestinian leadership; negotiations that may be preceded
or succeeded by the emergence of a sovereign Palestinian state. The first is
Israel’s security interests; interests that are still dependent on United States
support and could be in jeopardy if United States efforts at mediation are
sabotaged by the extreme right wing that now runs Israel.364 Failure in this
regard would compromise both U.S. and Israeli security interests. The second
major interest of Israel is the Israeli defense and promotion of the “legitimacy”
of Israel.365 This is an issue that is extremely sensitive to the current Israeli
leadership and their supporters in the diaspora community.366 The issue of
legitimacy emerged in part from the effort of Israeli detractors who suggested
that Israeli policy regarding non-Jewish inhabitants of the State were being
subjected to policies analogous to some aspects of apartheid.367 Since
apartheid was used by South African detractors to delegitimate the apartheid
state, Israel’s opponents felt that Israeli policy and practices with regard to the
364
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Palestinians had vulnerabilities ominously close to the policies and practices of
Apartheid.368 For example, efforts to create a boycott of Israeli trade and
cultural changes were vigorously opposed by Israeli interests.369 However, the
problems of legitimacy now seem to be tied to the beliefs, ideology and
policies of the extreme right wing in Israel. And these policies committed to
the Eretz Israel idea, which have racial overtones, suggest that repudiation of
boundaries supported by international law and the idea that sovereigns cannot
acquire territory as a consequence of conquest only exacerbates the problems
of legitimacy. Moreover, as a seen above, the treatment of the Palestinians
appears to be discriminatory, and the recent war in Gaza seems to have
involved a vastly disproportionate use of force implicating the possibility of
war crimes violations.370 One of the most difficult issues, at least for the
United States and for many sectors of the international community, is the
extreme right wing ideology with racist overtones and concerns about the
attacks of international legal institutions.371 These are concerns that are
problematic for Israeli allies who generally represent liberal democratic
ideological values. Indeed, it is maintained that the overwhelming majority of
Jewish Americans are inclined to liberal democratic values.372 It cannot be
said that these values are shared by the current ruling elite in Israel. We now
proceed to consider related Israeli interests.
Any important Israeli security interest could be clarified and advanced
with the recognition of Palestinian statehood. Israel has argued that rocket
and terrorist attacks from the occupied territories gives it a right of selfdefense to respond to such attacks.373 However, this claim has not met with
an approval that carries a global consensus.374 The technical argument
against Israel’s claim to assert the right of self-defense is based on the
principle that the occupied territories under Palestinian National Authority
control are not recognized as a nation state. It is therefore maintained that
368
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Israel cannot assert its right of self-defense against an entity that is not a
sovereign state in international law.375 This view has been supported by the
following authorities. The Congress has enacted legislation expressing a
contrary view, suggesting that Israel does have a right of self-defense under
these circumstances. The U.S. Congress may of course declare international
law; but the currency of its declaration (which is essentially unilateral) would
seem to require more international acceptance for it to be seen as reflecting
positive international law. If the Palestinians were granted sovereign nation
status, there would be no ambiguity regarding the assertion of the right of
self-defense. This at least makes it unequivocal that an Israeli self-defense
response is clearly consistent with international law and international
obligation. At the same time, the right to self-defense in international law
clearly telegraphs the corresponding obligations (of proportionality, etc.) on
the Palestinian state, as well as the consequences to follow if those
obligations were unmet.
One implicit principle drawn from the claim of the right of self-defense
by both Israel and the United States is that they are implicitly recognizing the
qualities of statehood and sovereignty of the Palestinians in the occupied
territories by holding them to a standard that unequivocally applies to
sovereign nation states. To the extent that the right of self-defense is
clarified by Palestinian sovereignty, the mutual security interests of each
body politic are significantly enhanced.376
The fate of the state of Israel may be at stake, should Israeli leaders
continue to stall development of Palestinian self-determination while
forbidding real integration into Israeli society. By aggravating the
resentment of the Palestinians while disregarding the disapproval of global
opinion, Israel faces difficult times ahead. For so long, the Palestinian
militants were characterized as terrorists because the world looked down on
their resistance to the emerging Jewish state of Israel;377 but these militants
may one day be labeled “freedom fighters” if the global consensus holds that
the militants belong to an emerging state that was wrongly repressed by
Israel.378
To receive the protection of international law rules and
375
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organizations, Israel must behave with the humanity and lawfulness that
international law entities (such as the U.N. Security Council) have come to
expect from new states.
One of the concerns that observers in Israel have noted with considerable
disquiet is the emergence of racism in Israel. They believe this is fueled by
the extremist right wing political parties. The first point here is that Israeli
intellectuals and human rights campaigners are embarrassed by this. The
Jews in the diaspora have been millennial victims of vicious racism that has
expressed itself as an ideological structure of “anti-Semitism.”379 The
practices against Jews fueled by the banner of anti-Semitism culminated in
the worst racist disaster the global community has ever experienced.380 That
disaster where Jews were the primary victims was the Holocaust by the
Nazis.381 It is therefore a great embarrassment to many Jews that some
extremists in Israel feel free to exhibit the worst behaviors of pathological
racism.382 The non-settlement of matters with the Palestinians fuels this level
of insecurity.383 It will therefore seem to be a matter of some national
urgency in Israel that a settlement be expedited. We hold that a sound
settlement would serve as powerful antidote to the insipient pathologies of
racism fueled by Israeli right-wing fanatics. The two-state solution seems to
be one of the most achievable objectives in a settlement and therefore is a
matter of important national interest for the state of Israel. It is worthy of
note that the basic and fundamental interests of Israel is its right under
international law and practice, to exist. It is possible that the two-state
solution must do more than theoretically assure the existence of Israel.
Recently Fidel Castro, former President of Cuba, stressed in an interview
Israel’s right to exist and its concerns in the aftermath of the Holocaust that
require important future assurances.384 Castro stressed that the right to exist
was a matter free from any doubt.
One of the most important contributions that Israeli society can make to
the process of the creation of a peaceful Palestinian state is to contribute
positively to the construction of institutions that value democracy and human
rights Israeli society has a good progressive peace movement. This

379

Michel Wieviorka, Racism and Diasporas, 52 THESIS ELEVEN 69 (1998).
Id.
381
Id.; NORMAN G. FINKELSTEIN, THE HOLOCAUST INDUSTRY: REFLECTIONS ON THE
EXPLOITATION OF JEWISH SUFFERING (2d ed. 2003).
382
Wieviorka, supra note 379.
383
Id.
384
Barak Ravid, Netanyahu: Fidel Castro has a Deep Understanding of Jewish History,
HAARETZ (Sept. 25, 2010), http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/Netanyahu-fide
l-castro-has-a-deep-understanding-of-jewish-history-1.315630.
380

396

GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.

[Vol. 40:341

movement, contrary to the right wing sentiment in Israel, is not sectarian.385
To the extent the PLO wants to construct a nonsectarian Palestinian state, it
would be symbolically useful to have some modest degree of collaboration
with the progressives in the region to advance the task of nation building in
accordance with democracy and human rights principles. It may be difficult,
even for Palestinians, to work in cooperation with the Israelis, especially
Israeli progressives. However, such cooperation would send a powerful signal
that repudiates the racism currently a part of the right wing agenda in Israel.
Israel also has a courageous human rights movement with an abundance of
legal talent386 and this resource could be extremely valuable in establishing ties
of mutual trust and common interest in institutionalizing the culture of peace
and human rights in a new Palestinian state. Such ties, driven by the forces of
civil society and with financial support from progressives in the U.S. and
Europe, would do a great deal to change the paradigm of relations from
conflict to sustainable collaboration in the common interest of all peoples in
the region. It should be noted that the driving force behind the Israeli peace
lobby and human rights groups has a profound connection to the sacred
literature of Judaism, which stresses that justice is integral to every form of
human relationship.387 The idea is well expressed in the Book of Amos “let
justice roll down like waters and righteousness like an ever-flowing stream.”388
C. U.S. Interests in a Two-State Solution
The continuance of conflict and tension between Israel, the Palestinians,
and other Middle East states constitutes a serious security concern for the
United States.389 In large measure, the conflict (at least in terms of popular
perception in the Muslim world) sees a Muslim population being deprived of
its most fundamental civil, political, and economic rights, and the repression is
fueled by extremist elements in Israel, and their supporters in the United
States.390 The conflict tends to assume the dimensions of ethnic/religious
fanaticism, and such fanaticism invariably breeds apocalyptic visions that are
embraced by alienated terrorists.391 The continuance of the conflict, with no
385
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conceivable end in sight, has now become a much more immediate national
security concern.392 The United States was attacked on September 11, 2001 by
the Al Qaeda organization;393 and one of the justifications for the attack was
the U.S.’s unconditional support for Israel and its policies vis-à-vis the
Palestinians.394 The U.S. response to 9/11 involved the nation in high intensity
conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan.395 It has been recognized that a central
motivating tool for the alienation of activist Muslims, and their deployment as
terrorists, is facilitated by the belief that Israel and its policies of occupation
simply represent an extension of U.S. policy.396 Hence, the anger directed at
Israeli occupation and Israeli anti-Muslim policies may also be attributable to
the United States. As a consequence, the continuance of this conflict fuels an
ostensible justification for anti-Americanism and an assumption that,
fundamentally, United States, too, is anti-Muslim.397 Given that there is a
global population of close to 2 billion Muslims, the Israeli-Palestinian
occupation is an obvious catalyst to move from alienation to terrorism.398
It appears that the Obama Administration and the U.S. security
establishment are aware of these issues.399 When the Obama Administration
came to office, they were confronted by concerns in the security
establishment that dragging out this conflict served as a recruiting tool for
alienated jihadist terrorists.400 The specific issue for the United States
regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict became the security threat posed by
ongoing conflict in the region.401 The current administration therefore
brought a significant team of talented negotiators to press for the restart of
negotiations toward a settlement.402 However, U.S. foreign policy regarding
Israel is significantly conditioned by more than twenty-five pro-Israeli lobby
groups in Washington, D.C.403
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These groups are attentive to the needs of Israel’s ultranationalist cause;
and, whatever the Israeli ultranationalist cause wants, it gets.404 The tools
used by them and their allies in the United States are sophisticated and
incredibly effective.405 For example, for several months now, domestic
Israeli lobby groups have been giving the U.S. government and Congress a
full-court press to prevent the recognition of a Palestinian state and, should
the matter come before the Security Council, to be assured that the United
States would exercise a veto in order to prevent a resolution supporting the
recognition of a sovereign Palestinian state.406 This requires the Palestinians
to think more carefully about the principles and strategies for which it can
stake a successful claim for sovereign independence. Israeli opposition
effectually carries the support of the United States only because of the
targeted pressure U.S. lobby groups can bring.407
The influence of “The Lobby” is most recently evidenced in the recent
House Resolution, No. 1765, reaffirming “strong opposition to any attempt
to establish or seek recognition of a Palestinian state outside of an agreement
negotiated between Israel and the Palestinians.”408
This Resolution
emphasized the principle that a lasting peaceful solution will only come
about through the negotiations of both parties (meaning the state of Israel
and the representatives of the Palestinian people).409 What the Resolution
does not address is the inability of the Palestinian representatives to negotiate
any solution with Israel while the parties bear such inequality in status.410
Moreover, in condemning efforts of the Palestinian people to seek statehood
(even by purely peaceful and legal means) outside of negotiation with Israel,
the U.S. House undermines U.S. treaty obligations to support the
achievement of statehood for the Palestinians.411
This successful lobbying effort on behalf of the state of Israel reveals two
characteristic aspects of the U.S. Israeli Lobby. First, it can powerfully
refocus the attention of the United States—even during the holidays, even
with a “lame duck” Congress, even when the PA has committed no
indiscretion justifying United States behavior contrary to its international law
obligations and its own national interests.412 Second, the U.S. Israeli Lobby
404
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does not engage with the U.S. government for U.S. interests but rather in the
interest of Israel (arguably to the detriment of the United States’ foreign
relations and security interests).413 Here, the simplistic idea, which some
Congressional Representatives accept, is that Israeli and U.S. interests are the
same.414 A more discriminating view would see that Israel has discrete
interests.415 Not all these interests are the same as U.S. interests.416
Moreover, from a global point of view, U.S. interests clearly transcend the
particular state interests of the state of Israel. It was the statesman Disraeli
who once said that “states do not have friends, they have interests.” Sorting
out areas that are distinctive to Israel and distinctive to the United States
would be a good starting point. It should be noted that the neoconservatives
strongly believe that there are no security differences between Israeli and
U.S. security.
There are, moreover, reports that well-placed
neoconservatives pass on sensitive information to Israeli officials on the
assumption that, since there is no difference between Israel and the United
States, by definition, they are not really passing on secrets.
The question is whether U.S. national interests are discrete, even if
somewhat overlapping, with the national interests of Israel. However, it
seems clear that the continuing conflict in Israeli-occupied Palestine
increasingly undermines important United States interests.
General Petraeus has raised a concern that, at least in the war against
terrorism in Afghanistan, the continuance of the conflict between Israelis and
Palestinians serves as a recruiting tool for the global jihadists who commit
themselves to terrorist operations against U.S. forces and interests.417 At
least from a security point of view and from the point of view of the risks to
the lives of U.S. soldiers and civilians who are serving in zones of danger,
there clearly is a distinct U.S. interest in having the Israelis and the
Palestinians shift their positions from conflict to some form of
accommodation.
The current Administration has taken this matter so seriously that the
President went to Cairo to address the billions of alienated Muslims.418
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413
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Although the speech was widely regarded as a positive sign, this speech
probably sent some apprehensions through the communications networks of
the Israeli ultranationalist movement (sometimes described as the Israeli
“right-wing”).419 Moreover, it is not at all clear that holding out the olive
branch to the Muslim world would be a matter acceptable to the
ultranationalist elements of the Israeli lobby.420
The continuing deterioration of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has gotten
to the administration.421 It has therefore made it a significant initiative of its
foreign policy to purposefully move the parties to a meaningful negotiations
posture.422 To do this, it drew on one of the heavy weights in negotiating
accommodations in situations of complex conflict: George Mitchell.423
Additionally, the President’s team has a strong Secretary of State (Hillary
Clinton), who has no baggage suggesting any alienation against Israel.424
Additionally, the Vice President, a strong supporter of Israel, is fully backing
the U.S. initiative.
A high point in the Obama initiative emerged in Washington, D.C. on
September 2, when Prime Minister Netanyahu and Palestinian President
Abbas met and the Israeli Prime Minister declared that the success of the
resumed negotiations would depend on both his and Abbas’ readiness to
“make painful concessions.”425 The critical question that we address is
whether Netanyahu was making a statement that was merely a temporary
bend in the wind and that he did not in fact intend to consider seriously.
The seriousness of the breakdown in talks between the Palestinians and
Israelis and the effort to undermine U.S. mediation efforts have also
prompted some of America’s most distinguished public servants to issue a
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419
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widely publicized document under the title “A Letter to President
Obama.”426 The authors of this letter are extremely disquieted by the failure
of U.S. Middle East diplomacy. They see this as exacerbating Israeli
isolationism and undermining moderation among the Palestinians. They see
the political vacuum as dangerous for all parties. They therefore urged for a
renewed American effort to revive its role in Middle East diplomacy.
Providing a profoundly realistic summation of the central problems that
confront the concerned parties, one of the issues they highlight is the vexing
problem of the borders, but they also state that
it is not the State of Israel within its 1967 borders that is being
challenged. It is Israel’s occupation, the relentless enlargement
of its settlements, its dispossession of the Palestinian people in
the West Bank and in East Jerusalem, and the humanitarian
disaster caused by its blockade of Gaza that are the target of
international anger and condemnation.427
These writers concluded their letter with a recommended framework for a
permanent status accord. We quote from their letter and summarized the gist
of their recommendations:
We understand, Mr. President, that the initiative we propose
you take to end the suffering and statelessness of the
Palestinian people and the efforts to undermine Israel’s
legitimacy is not without political risks. But we believe that if
the American people are fully informed by the President of the
likely consequences of the abandonment of US leadership in a
part of the world so critical to this country’s national security
and to the safety of our military personnel in the region, he will
have their support.428
It is unclear whether this letter has been distributed to the entire Congress
and to the major lobby groups in Washington with an Israeli interest. We
conclude this section by providing a summary of what is proposed:
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They recommend the U.S. staunchly defend the legitimacy
of Israel. This is qualified by the phrase “within
internationally recognized borders”;
The U.S. must support the establishment of a Palestinian
sovereign State based on the 1967 borders. Territorial
adjustments are to be made by agreement only. Unilateral
acquisitions of territory in violation of international
borders would not be recognized nor given legitimacy;
The U.S. will work towards a fair solution to the refugee
problem. U.S. commitment is based on the realism of the
unlimited flow of refugees which would dramatically
affect the demographics of Israel;
The U.S. will have a crucial role to play in appropriate
security policy for both Israel and Palestine. Here, the
U.S. supports a demilitarized Palestinian State with
security mechanisms that address Israel’s concerns and
still respect Palestinian sovereignty. This could include
the stationing for multinational force as appropriate;
The policy on the emotive and touchy issue of Jerusalem,
they recommend a form of complex shared control and
unimpeded access to holy places;
The U.S. supports the reconciliation of Fatah and Hamas
on terms compatible with the above principles and UN
Security Council resolutions 242 and 338.429

As we see in the next section, these principles which provide a promising
starting point for the Palestinians represent issues that may be anathema to
Netanyahu and his supporters.
D. U.S. Interests and the Ultra-Nationalist Leadership in Israel
The Israeli peace scholar Uri Avnery is pessimistic with regard to the
current leadership in Israel. “Netanyahu, of course, has no peace plan. His
declared position is that the Palestinians must return to direct negotiations
without prior conditions, but only after they officially recognize Israel as ‘the
state of the Jewish people.’ The Palestinians would never agree to accepting
Israel as an exclusively ethnic Jewish state when there are over a million
Israeli Arab citizens living there.”430 According to Israeli scholar Uri Avnery
429
430
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the interjection into the negotiations of the recognition of Israel as a Jewish
state has no coherent intellectual content and is used by Netanyahu “as a
trick to obstruct the establishment of the Palestinian State. This week he
declared that the conflict has no solution.”431 Avnery adds that to deny “the
Jewish character” of the state is tantamount to the worst of all political
felonies: to claim that Israel is a “State of all its citizens.”432
Netanyahu’s position is amplified to excess by his Foreign Minister.
“The position of the Israeli Foreign Minister holds out even less hope for a
settlement. Lieberman believes that the Palestinians cannot be a peace
partner because they do not want peace. According to Lieberman, ‘[e]ven if
we offer the Palestinians Tel Aviv and they withdraw to the 1947 borders,
they will find a reason not to sign the peace treaty.’ ”433
Lieberman also stresses that, currently, the Palestinians have no
legitimate leaders because Mahmoud Abbas’ term expired on
the 15th January, 2009. Lieberman himself also adverts to the
stability of the current coalition government running Israel. He
states, “[i]n the present political circumstances, it is impossible
for us to present a plan for a permanent settlement, because the
coalition simply will not survive.”
If Lieberman sees no final agreement, Netanyahu holds out for an interim
agreement of multigenerational duration. The idea of an interim agreement
simply means that settlement expansion will occur and East Jerusalem will
be incorporated into Israel.434 It should be noted that most recently
Netanyahu had a telephone conversation with Angela Merkel, the German
Chancellor. The gist of this conversation is reported in Avnery’s newsletter
of March 5, 2011. According to Avnery;
Netanyahu called to rebuke Angela Merkel for Germany’s vote
in favor of the Security Council resolution condemning the
settlements — the resolution blocked by the scandalous US veto.
I don’t know if our Prime Minister mentioned the Holocaust, but
he certainly expressed his annoyance about Germany daring to
vote against the “Jewish State.” He was shocked by the answer.
Instead of a contrite Frau Merkel apologizing abjectly, his ear
was filled by a schoolmistress scolding him in no uncertain
431
432
433
434
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terms. She told him that he had broken all his promises, that no
one of the world’s leaders believes a single word of his anymore.
She demanded that he make peace with the Palestinians.435
When the Israeli Foreign Minister (Lieberman) recently spoke before the
U.N. General Assembly, indicating that (contrary to Netanyahu’s Washington,
D.C. statements) there was no chance for a peace treaty (not within a year or
100 years), this implied a multigenerational interim agreement and limitless
Israeli occupation.436 Lieberman’s solution is to radically press for an Israeli
state free of Arabs.437 It is unclear whether this implies ethnic cleansing for
non-Jews; but that would appear to be what Lieberman has in mind.
As Israel’s Foreign Minister, Lieberman is an important influence on
Israeli foreign policy and, in particular, the promise (or lack of it) of
negotiating a settlement. Recently, he summoned Israel’s 170 senior
diplomats to provide them with a firsthand account of his thinking.438 It
should be understood that, according to Avnery, Netanyahu does not have a
peace plan. He has only insisted that the Palestinians return to negotiations
without prior conditions, but only after they recognize Israel as a state of the
Jewish people.439 Such recognition clearly repudiates the Israeli Declaration
of Independence, which rejects such a definition of the state.440 It is unlikely
that the Palestinians who are committed to a secular state would seek to
endorse a racially chauvinistic state. Lieberman holds to a view that is more
concrete and more radical that Netanyahu.441 Lieberman firmly believes that
the Palestinians do not want peace. According to Lieberman, “ ‘even if [we]
offer the Palestinians Tel Aviv and a withdrawal to the 1947 borders, they
will find a reason not to sign a peace treaty.’ (The 1947 borders, fixed by the
United Nations, gave Israel 55% of the country, while the 1949–1967
borders left Israel with 78%.).”442 Additionally, Lieberman believes that,
since the term of Mahmoud Abbas has expired, there is no one to negotiate
with.443 Finally, Lieberman stresses that moving purposefully with peace
435
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negotiations would split the right-wing coalition and possibly their
government would not survive.444 In short, the survival of the current
coalition is far more important than reaching a permanent settlement with the
Palestinians. Since Lieberman believes this coalition will last indefinitely,
peace may not be possible presently or indeed in the coming decades.
Therefore, Israel should strive for a “Long-Term Interim Agreement.”445
The essence of this is of course a long-term period of occupancy. The carrot
to the Palestinians would essentially be to give them a bigger piece of the
economic pie. Avnery sums up Lieberman as follows: “The occupation will
continue until one of the following happens: either the Palestinian standard
of living will reach that of Israel or the Messiah will come—whichever
happens first. In any case, there is no clear indication that either will happen
within the next few decades.”446
Netanyahu put some mild distance between Lieberman’s views and his
own. The mildness of the distance may suggest that Netanyahu is (in
principle) on the same page as Lieberman. We must therefore look more
carefully at what Netanyahu’s policies are. It would seem that these policies
will be critical for the U.S. to better understand its role in this region.
Netanyahu’s father, Benzion Netanyahu, was a professor of history.447 He
was a deep believer in the Eretz Israel defining the target boundaries of
Israel.448 Netanyahu was raised in a family in which Israel’s historic
boundaries were sacred and inviolable.449 According to an Israeli journalist,
Netanyahu would “not dare to face his father and tell him that he has given
away parts of Eretz Israel.”450 Netanyahu’s personality is predisposed to
delay a successful peace negotiation in which boundary settlements are
envisioned.451
The most recent breaking development concerning settlement activity has
emerged as the Israeli government has apparently secured the assurance of a
U.S. veto.452 The U.S. has justified the veto, as has Israel, by claiming any
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resolution supporting a Palestinian State is an impediment to the process of
direct negotiations between the Palestinians and Israeli to secure a settlement.
As we noted earlier this year, the Israeli Prime Minister rejected a U.S. call for
a temporary cessation of settlement building activity in order restart the
negotiations toward a comprehensive settlement.453 The current Israeli
authorities have now approved the construction of 1,100 new Israeli housing
units in East Jerusalem on lands that ostensibly are within the dominion of the
Palestinians.454 Clearly such a move at this time tremendously undermines the
representations made by the Israeli Prime Minister and the American President
at the U.N. The United States, the European Union and the U.N. have all
expressed “disappointment” at this initiative and its unfortunate timing.455
U.S. Secretary of State, Hillary Rodham Clinton, indicated that this issue was
“counterproductive to efforts to launch peace talks.”456 She added that this
amounted to provocative action.457 Richard Miron, spokesman for U.N.
Middle East Envoy Robert Serry, indicated that the Jerusalem housing
announcement “sends the wrong signal at this sensitive time.”458 Palestinian
leaders have indicated that there be a halt to settlement building as a condition
for the resumption of peace talks.459 It seems to us that only strong pressure,
sufficiently important to compel him to shift his position, will make the
difference. Without such pressure, Obama is wasting his time. And, by
pressure, we do not mean only the pressure of the government. Critical to
pressuring Netanyahu will be a significant number of congressional
representatives, supporting the administration, and (even more critically)
getting the major Jewish organizations in the United States to be willing to
fully support a realistic peace process because it is in the national interest of
the United States and of Israel. So long as the Israeli support groups in the
United States provide support only to the Israeli ultranationalists, the
intransigence of the Israeli ultranationalists to commit to a realistic settlement
will be greater. This is not to say that the Israeli nationalists are the exclusive
stumbling block to a final resolution, but it certainly is a crucial barrier.
Finally, a continuation of conflict may suggest to the ultranationalists in Israel
that conflict favors them in the long haul. Israel’s military superiority is a
453
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destabilizing force that becomes even more dangerous when the levels of
conflict sporadically spiral out of control. They also create an incentive for the
states surrounding Israel to acquire nuclear weapons capabilities. Thus, the
conflict has global implications. Our sense is that a majority of the Israelis
would opt for a reasonable settlement with a reasonable adjustment of
territorial interests. We do not believe that a majority of Israelis are opposed
to a Palestinian state living in peace with Israel. However, like most
ultranationalist groups, the Israeli ultranationalist contingency is engaged,
energized, and occasionally fanatical.
Israel and the United States have divergent interests regarding military
intervention in the Middle East and sustaining the role of international law
regarding such interventions. The Bush Administration allied itself with
Israeli interests in the Middle East and the United States ended up fighting
wars both questionable for the benefit to U.S. interests and for the legal right
to preemptively engage in such wars under international law.460 The U.S.
policy leaders at the time invested in extravagant security ideas originally
generated by the Likud, such as the “Clean Break” doctrine. This doctrine
found itself mutated after 9/11 into the Bush Doctrine, which claimed
preemptive intervention.461 With the Israeli right-wing cheering, the U.S.
invaded Iraq, generating massive anti-Americanism not only in the Islamic
world but elsewhere.462 Nevertheless, the roots of the desire to attack Iraq
came from the Likud’s Clean Break Doctrine and Israel’s interest in regime
change was because they saw Saddam Hussein as a serious security
challenge to Israel.463 With Saddam gone, there has been a relentless
campaign for regime change Iran.464 In fact, the Israeli attack on Lebanon
and Hezbollah was, in effect, a transparent effort to provoke Iran into
intervention to protect its client (Hezbollah).465 When Iran restrained itself,
the Israelis found themselves in the midst of a significant tactical defeat.466
Still, Netanyahu and others (and their surrogate voices in the United States)
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stridently demand a U.S. attack on Iran.467 These views are vigorously
promoted by the Likud’s neoconservative allies.468 The question here is—
exactly to whom is Iran such a monumental threat? How imminent is this
threat (if it is a threat)? Clearly, both the United States and Israel have
interests in the evolution of Iranian politics, but these interests are not the
same. The Netanyahu “Clean Break” Doctrine had significant influence on
the “Bush Doctrine,” in particular its commitment to preemptive action and
regime change.469 The adherence to this doctrine in the United States is
largely—but not exclusively—affiliated with the pro-Israeli lobby groups as
well as the Republican neo-cons.470
In the Senate, Senators Graham and Lieberman have been most articulate
in demonizing Iran, describing the country as “extreme,” “expansionist,” and
“terrorist.”471 Graham has specifically indicated that the military option
against Iran should have in mind “the goal of changing the regime.”472 Bill
Kristol, the editor of the Weekly Standard and director of the Foreign Policy
Initiative, is a leading voice following Richard Perlel in the neoconservative
movement.473 Kristol believes that the credible threat of a military strike is
the only option to constrain Iranian ambitions.474 John Bolton, who was the
Bush Administrations’ undiplomatic ambassador to the U.N., has declared
that sanctions and negotiations against Iran are useless.475 He has stated that
the goal of neoconservative opinion makers should be to prepare U.S. public
opinion to support an Israeli attack on Iran.476 One of the most vociferous
467
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exponents of the use of force against Iran is Reuel Marc Gerecht, who
believes “an Israeli bombardment remains the only conceivable means of
derailing or seriously delaying Iran’s nuclear program.”477 Gerecht also
believes that an attack on Iran would force regime change. The hardline
ideologue Daniel Pipes is one of the most aggressively pro-Likud voices in
D.C.; he also has strong Islamophobia.478 Pipes has recently stated that the
recipe for salvaging the Obama presidency is the bombing of Iran.479 Pipes
maintains that if the United States is reluctant, Israel “should do the job.”480
Pipes is viewed by other conservatives as an extremist.481
The neoconservatives were the biggest drumbeaters for the attack on Iraq
and the neglect of Afghanistan.482 It was Iraq that was Israel’s major security
concern.483 The Iraq War was a trillion dollar war.484 The price continues to
mount.485 Additionally, there is strong opinion in the United States
indicating war fatigue.486 We would submit that it is not in the national
interest of the United States at this time to start a new war in the Middle East.
Moreover, it is doubtful, notwithstanding the unpopular attitude of the
Iranian regime, that the majority of the American people would support a
new neoconservative adventure. In this sense, it would be of value for the
Obama administration to repudiate those aspects of the Bush Doctrine that
are controversial and challenge international law. The pressures from Israel
and its supporters in the United States for a new war stem from the security
problems that are a product of the unstable situation in the region, generated
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significantly by the lack of settlement between the Israelis and the
Palestinians.
The United States has an interest in halting the evolution of Israel as a
center of international crime. Some analysts believe it to be the premier
money-laundering nation in the world and claim that Israeli criminal cartels
are deeply involved with smuggling blood diamonds, white slavery, human
trafficking, drug trafficking, and more.487 While assistance to Israel is
clearly not meant to support the criminal elements of Israeli society, it seems
clear that not enough is being done by the Israeli government to bring these
criminal elements under control. This, in turn, suggests that the Israeli
government condones or even colludes with these criminal non-government
actors—a behavior that must not be allowed in Israel, Palestine, or anywhere
on the world stage.
The U.S. supplies Israel with the best military technology;488 but in the
future this may not be in the best interest of the United States. Despite the
history of good relations in the past, Israel and the United States have been
on rocky footing in recent times.489 The United States could not influence
the Israeli government to halt settlements no matter how many highest-grade
fighter planes the United States offered them. Nor could the United States
induce Israel to behave with transparency and in conformity with
international law regarding their nuclear weapons. Indeed, Israel has a
significant trade in weapons sales; and holds that the weapons sales issues490
mean that Israel has no friends. Given the disinclination of Israel to
cooperate with U.S. diplomacy and international law norms, Israeli weapons
technologies may well be deployed against U.S. troops in the future.491
In these difficult financial times, there is the obvious interest of the U.S.
citizens in retaining the wealth transferred to Israel for activities that do not
engender peace. The state of high-security crisis in Israel is funded largely by
487
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U.S. assistance. In addition to supplementary sources of funding from private
U.S. individuals and organizations, there is enormous pressure on the U.S.
government to increase aid to Israel from $10 billion to at least $20 billion a
year.492 It is estimated that Israel has received some $2 trillion from the
American taxpayers since 1967.493 As vast billions of U.S. dollars are being
borrowed to fund the security needs of the state of Israel, this debt is passed to
the children of America’s future, along with mounting unrest in a region under
occupancy sustained by U.S. assistance. A dramatic move toward the
recognition of Palestinian statehood as a step toward an accelerated peaceful
settlement would lessen Israel’s security anxieties and the need for assistance
from borrowed trillions now owed by the U.S. taxpayers.494
U.S. policy and the interest groups involved in the Middle East should be
very discriminating about which groups they support in this region and in
Israel, to ensure that the U.S. interest in peace and security is not held
hostage by ultranationalist zealots.495 In terms of contemporary international
relations, Israeli ultra-nationalism is a danger to regional peace and security.
It is quite possible that the greater Israeli interests and U.S. interests are the
same, while the interests of the current Israeli leaders are different. The
critical challenge for pro-Israel individuals, communities, and lobby groups
in the United States is to determine which of their activities support U.S.
interests—particularly national security interests and longstanding peace in
the region—and which activities undermine U.S. interests.
E. Global Community’s Interests in a Two-State Solution
There are clearly some developments and precedents in international and
human rights law that would benefit the global community as a result of the
establishment of a Palestinian state (existing peacefully with the state of
Israel). There is clearly a problem with the current status of international law
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regarding stateless individuals.496 While treaties attempt to address their
problems, the reality is that customary international law affords little
protection to stateless people who suffer continuing abuses by other states.
Moreover, there is a problem with the U.N. Security Council veto-system,
which occasionally works to undermine the efforts of widely-held global
opinion.497 It would strengthen the force of the United Nations (and,
consequently, international law) to have the U.N. Security Council bypass
mechanism in effect yet again to give power to the General Assembly’s
voice.498 It reflects well of our times that the highest constituted authority
speaks for even the least represented. It is the next stage in the development
of the United Nations that the united “nations” include those people who still
do not have a state. And if statehood is the requirement for a “nation” to
have a vote, then all nations deserve a state. One final point. The Israeli
right wing and its neoconservative allies have been waging a relentless war
against the United Nations. This is not good for Israel, for the U.S. or the
U.N. The recognition of the Palestinian State may take us past the period of
international acrimony.
V. THE ROAD MAP FOR SECURING THE RECOGNITION OF PALESTINIAN
STATEHOOD
In the interest of achieving a just and stable peace in the contested lands
in the control of Israel (a goal implicit in the expeditious recognition of
Palestinian statehood), we make suggestions on a few policy matters. Most
of these suggestions must be acted upon by the Palestinian governing bodies.
Nevertheless, the transparency of these policy activities is crucial since, as
indicated earlier, members of the world community (including not only Israel
and members of the U.N. Security Council, but also individual states and
members of state associations) have important parts to play in the process of
achieving a viable state of Palestine.
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Of the two real paths to Palestinian statehood, one involves the help and
guidance of Israel to achieve the type of state indicated in the U.N. Resolution
on Partition and the Oslo Accords.499 Israel has long held the support of the
world community—especially the United States—in preparing for the final
agreement on Partition. However, the longer Israel delays this process (while
simultaneously refusing the Palestinian people real inclusion in a unified
society based on equal laws and equality of religion) and defies agreements to
contain settlement activities within established borders, Israel increasingly
risks isolating itself from the external powers that have supported its activities
(and refused “unilateral” recognition to a state of Palestine). This “unilateral”
path is the alternative path to Palestinian statehood—unilateral recognition
under international law, bolstered by international relations, and—ultimately—
sanctified by the U.N. Security Council.
The negotiations process overseen by the Obama administration has
completely broken down recently.500 This has been due in large part to
extraordinary contingencies that Israeli representatives have placed upon
negotiation, which included the Palestinian recognition of Israel as an
ethnically exclusive state and the premise that Jerusalem belongs to Israel
(and, as such, that there are no restraints to the building of settlements in East
Jerusalem).501 Moreover, as the Israelis have embarked on more settlement
activity, the Palestinians have refused to participate as well.502 Both
President Obama and Secretary of State Clinton condemned these
contingencies and the continuing settlements as unhelpful to the negotiations
process.503 A more candid view may be that these activities are “deal
breakers,” and the Israeli government intends to disappoint, recklessly
undermining legitimate expectations under law to continue negotiating a fair
resolution of the problem in good faith with the Palestinian people.
Such an assessment—that current Israeli leaders are actively blocking
Palestinians’ efforts to achieve statehood—is one that the Palestinian
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National Authority (and the world community) must consider. In such a
case, where Israeli policies actively damage Palestinians’ interests in their
property, security, and ultimate self-determination, the body governing the
Palestinian people in the West Bank and Gaza (currently, the PNA), must
consider moving forward “unilaterally”; and, so long as the PNA acts with
regard to contemporary standards of human rights and rule-of-law norms, the
international community has an ethical obligation to support the Palestinians’
efforts. Moreover, certain states and international entities have a legal
obligation to support the Palestinians’ efforts.504 There are strong policy
decisions and moves to be made. We take the liberty of presenting some
suggestions as to how to proceed strategically.
A. The PA Should Establish a Functioning Government Explicitly Based on
International Law Criteria
The PA may not be considered to have sufficient control over Palestine,
given that its authority is subordinate to Israel’s sovereign control under the
Oslo Accords and the Interim Agreement’s express prohibition of PA from
conducting foreign relations.505 However the PA should move to the process
of elections from the old Palestinian Parliament, to a newly constituted
Parliamentary authority. It is probably appropriate that the Parliament act to
create a constituent Assembly for the purpose of drafting a Constitution of
the State of Palestine.
B. The PA Should Promote “Good Governance” by Establishing the
Preconditions for a Parliament to Create a Constituent Assembly and to
Draft a New, Sovereign Constitution
We are uncertain whether the documents generated by the PNA amount
to a constitution (as compared to constitutions in contemporary practice).
We would suggest, however, that in preparation for recognition the historic
documents be integrated into a formal constitution of the state of Palestine.
Our recommendation would further be that this should be a document
meeting the best contemporary normative standards. In other words, the
504
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form of governance should be democratic, transparent, accountable, and
responsible. It should also be founded on the “rule of law” principle.506
Additionally, we would suggest that the PNA examine the Badinter
Arbitration Commission’s deliberations concerning the recognition of the
statehood of the Balkan states (including Bosnia and Herzegovina).507 The
Badinter Commission carefully reviewed the constitutions of these new
states for the purpose of recognition by the European Union and (later) by
the United Nations. These were obtained on the basis that the constitutions
made the rights and duties of individuals depend on citizenship (rather than
ethnicity or religious identity).
Recognition by the United Nations, in any event, is dependent on a
showing that the entity claiming sovereignty has the willingness and capability
of upholding the principles of the U.N. Charter. In short, the entity must be
peace loving and committed to human rights and the rule of law.
C. The PLO Should Reaffirm the 1988 Declaration of Independence in Light
of the Creation of a New Government and a New Constitution
By reaffirming the earlier 1988 Declaration508 the PNA is stressing the
consistent and continuing demand of the right of the Palestinian people to
self-determination and independence. Reaffirming this iteration strengthens
the perception of the coherence and continuity of the Palestinian perspective
of identity.
D. The PNA Should Secure Bilateral Recognition of the New Government
and State Worldwide
The actual process of recognition is complex. At one level, states usually
claim that (as a function of their sovereignty) they have complete discretion
whether to recognize another state or not.509 On the other hand, recognition
by regional associations of states tends to be less politicized and more
focused on the willingness and sense of obligation to conform to regional
standards of peace, security, and human rights.510 We would recommend
that the PA present its case to states that clearly would recognize it as a state
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on a bilateral basis. It is possible that the Palestinians could get 90% of the
world’s states recognizing them.511
E. The PNA Should Encourage Regional Organizations to Recognize the
New Government and State
These would include such organizations as the Arab League, the Arab
League Educational, Cultural and Scientific Organization (ALECSO), and
the Economic and Social Council of the Arab League’s Council of Arab
Economic Unity (CAEU). We would also simultaneously recommend that
the PA secure recognition from regional alliances of states (such as the
League of Arab States, the African Union, the European Union, the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations, and others). Our sense is, if a
sizable number of individual states recognize Palestinian statehood, it would
ease recognition in regional associations of states. This would strengthen the
sovereignty process of Palestine before the United Nations.
F. The PNA Should Seek to Secure a General Assembly Resolution
Recognizing the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, and
Government of the Palestinian State
The pitch to the United Nations is more complicated. The U.N. Security
Council is initially seized of the matter and essentially makes a
recommendation to the U.N. General Assembly whether a state should be
recognized.512 The problem here is that one of the permanent members can
exercise the veto power.513 Still it may be of some value to have a General
Assembly vote on a recommendation to the Security Council that upon its
findings of fact and conclusions of law the Palestinian claim to statehood is
well founded. It should also be noted that Resolution 181 of the General
Assembly stipulated that the partition envisioned the creation of an “Arab
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State.”514 Technically, General Assembly Resolutions are not binding.515
However, the target audience of this Resolution assumed that it was a legally
binding instrument.516 The Israelis acted on this Resolution to declare their
independent status and to regard the borders as the legal territorial boundary.
When the Palestinians present their case for recognition and statehood, it
would seem to be that they are simply asking for a reaffirmation of a
preexistent General Assembly Resolution that appears to be the juridical
standard in which Israel declared its sovereign independence. Presumably
therefore the recognition here is simply a reaffirmation of Resolution 181. It
is possible that the issue could be referred for confirmation to the Security
Council. Should that happen, it might be important for the Palestinian
authority to seek in advance the support of the Council.
G. The PNA Should Seek to Secure Security Council Support
Since the Pro-Israeli Lobby will be very active in securing the veto, the
Palestinians and their allies would have to expend enormous resources to
reach out to the U.S. government and, if possible, to reach out to liberal
Jewish groups in the United States, in order to nullify the dominating role of
AIPAC and others. If the wider assessment is that these recent Israeli moves
were designed to derail the U.S.-sponsored peace talks,517 they provide a
greater incentive for the recognition of a sovereign Palestinian state.
Additionally it would help the Palestinian effort to influence U.S. policy and
the liberal Jewish lobby groups in the U.S. if it were to secure the support of
the complex groups and perspectives in Israeli society. There is a very
powerful peace lobby in Israel. Their support will be critical. There is a
vigorous and courageous human rights constituency in Israel and their voices
would carry weight with the U.S. and with some Jewish lobby groups in the
U.S. It would also be of value for the PA to seek the support of liberal and
labor elements in the Knesset. This too would be useful in terms of
solidifying public opinion behind their cause.
One of the strident Likud-supporting lobby groups in the United States
has already been aggressively working to get the U.S. government to
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exercise the veto in the Security Council over Palestinian statehood.518 This
suggests that an enormous amount of political work must be done to ensure
that the U.S. does not exercise the veto and, at the minimum, remains
neutral. Such a strategy must generate some support inside the United States
for the recognition of the Palestinian state. We suspect that a part of that
argument could be that it is not for the Netanyahu government to decide to
block Palestinian statehood—this is matter for the international community.
In this sense, one hopes that, for salvaging the peace process, the United
States will not exercise its veto in such circumstances.
H. The PA Should Develop a Strategy to Move Around a U.S. Veto of
Security Council Recognition of Palestinian Statehood and Sovereignty
Under International Law
Given the furious lobby activity by the pro-ultranationalist lobbyists,
there is a strong possibility that the United States will veto any resolution
before the Security Council providing statehood for the Palestinian people.
In general, a veto normally means that the matter is concluded before the
United Nations.519 However, there is a little-used procedure that was
invented by the United States to develop a procedure to get around the
exercise of a Security Council veto, if that veto undermined the importance
of protecting international peace and security. This procedure became
known as the “Uniting for Peace Resolution.”520
It was used when the Security Council, because of a veto, was incapable
of performing its primary functions concerning the protection and promotion
of international peace and security.521 This Resolution assumed that, since
the problem relating to peace and security remained, there was a residual
competence in the U.N. General Assembly to pass a Resolution by a
supermajority, permitting U.N. action to be taken in the protection of
international peace and security.522 In this context, the PA’s allies in the
General Assembly could certainly make the case that the recognition of
Palestinian statehood is a major factor in promoting international peace and
security in the region. Moreover, the interminable state of occupancy, which
Security Council Resolution 242523 stipulates must be ended, gives additional
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recognition to the importance that recognition of statehood for the
Palestinian people has for peace and security. Judging from the support
already generated for the recognition of statehood as an indispensible step to
resolving conflict and crisis in the region, there should be a greater than
supermajority that may be used to overcome a U.S. veto in the Security
Council. This interpretative innovation to the U.N. Charter was—it should
be recalled—a U.S. initiative. This initiative was upheld by the International
Court of Justice in its advisory judgment of The Expenses Case.524 If it is
clear that there already is a supermajority to support the use of the “Uniting
for Peace” Resolution to overcome the exercise of a U.S. veto, the U.S.
Administration may be less enthusiastic about either the exercise of the veto,
or the idea that the veto will be surmounted by the overwhelming strength of
international public opinion. In short, the United States, to avoid the
embarrassment of complete isolation and defeat, may simply abstain in the
U.N. Security Council regarding this issue.
VI. CONCLUSION
Finally, we wish to reassert that we assign a positive value judgment to
being pro human rights and essential justice for all. As a jurist and a human
rights practitioner, my ultimate loyalty lies not with any state, organization,
or even community, but instead with the values of peace, wellbeing, and
freedom from fear for all individuals. From this perspective, my position is
that the recognition of the state of Palestine is essential for achieving the
wider realization of these values, for the people of Palestine, for the people
of Israel, and even for the people of the United States. It is possible that
there are other possible futures for Israel and Palestine. We have however
sought to limit the scope of the spectrum so as to reduce the complexity of an
already complex problem.
The issue of the U.N. role in the status of Palestinian claims to selfdetermination, statehood and sovereignty is a matter under furious debate
and aggressive diplomacy in the U.N. President Obama, in his speech before
the United Nations General Assembly on September 21, 2011,525 sought to
framed U.S. foreign policy in terms that justified its diplomatic efforts to
block the issue from coming before the U.N. at all and with a clear
implication that if it came before the Security Council the U.S. would
524
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exercise its veto to block a decision on Palestinian sovereignty and
statehood.526 This decision however, acknowledges that the U.S. supports a
two-state solution as a realistic basis for sustainable peace. Moreover, it
stresses that Israeli security issues still remain a stumbling block to progress.
It also acknowledges that the Palestinians “deserve to know the territorial
basis of their state.”527 Given the clarity of these issues the President also
insists that these issues cannot be resolve with support from outside
negotiating parties such as The Quartet on the Middle East, which includes
the United Nations, United States, European Union and Russia.528 It is
hoped that the President statement is not an inadvertent repudiation of the
Quartet process, because it represents the major security players in the global
environment. The problem with the negotiations is to a large extent the
significant shift in Israeli politics toward the right, and an unwillingness of
the President to acknowledge that the new right-wing coalition in Israel is a
reluctant negotiator. Indeed, everyone knows that settlement activity should
at least cease during active negotiations. This indeed was acknowledged by
the Obama administration. It was rejected by Netanyahu, who knew that this
was a deal breaker to continuing negotiations. In effect, the U.S. role as an
honest broker was essentially castrated and the U.S. was left diplomatically
humiliated.529 The Israeli right wing agenda also included a demand that
Palestine and presumably the Quartet should recognize that Israel is not a
State based on secular rights and duties if citizenship but makes rights turn
on ethnicity.530 This is another deal breaker because there are a million plus
Israeli citizens who would be excluded from rights because they do not have
the right ethnic pedigree. This is another unnecessary stumbling block and
indeed is a complete repudiation of the Israeli Declaration of Independence.
Given the pluralistic nature of the United States and its struggle to repudiate
discrimination based on race or ethnicity it is surprising that a black
President with a multi-ethnic pedigree would not call Mr. Netanyahu on this
issue. Additionally, the Camp David Accords, negotiated by President
Jimmy Carter, recognize Security Council resolutions which delimit Israeli
and Palestinian boundaries.531
The United States voted for these
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resolutions.532 Israel negotiated the Camp David Accords on the basis of
these resolutions.533 It is a real pity and a failure if U.S. diplomacy not to
recognize its role in the Security Council and at Camp David on the issue of
boundaries. Finally, the President obscures the fact that the hidden subtext
that suggests only agreement between the parties is the exclusive basis for
moving forward essentially gives the Israeli right wing an indefinite veto
over any otherwise legitimate international claim to self-determination,
statehood and sovereignty. The Oslo Accords can never be read to suggest
that they set in motion a process of negotiation that might continue in a
timeless manner. Regrettably, the President’s rhetoric about Palestinian and
Israeli interests seems to represent only a shallow sense of what as a State the
interests of Israel are, the interests of the Palestinians might be, and the
national vital interests of the United States in speeding up negotiations
toward a viable and sustainable conclusion. In this sense Obama’s speech is
devoid of strategic vision, tactical specificity or indeed a genuine
understanding of the interplay of national interests, regional interests and
fundamental global values.
We hope that this analysis of the legal effects of past practice and facts on
the ground, in combination with policy suggestions for recognition of the
state of Palestine, offers a shared backdrop against which the deliberations of
Palestinians and Israelis (as well as the global community) may continue
toward the universal goals of achieving self-determination, independent
stability, widespread peace, and essential dignity.
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